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ABSTRACT 
This project attempts to answer how and why nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) campaigns were effective in achieving their desired outcomes in the campaign to 
ban landmines and the campaign to stop the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAl). Second, the project asks how and why NGOs were effective in influencing 
Canadian foreign policy on landmines and the MAl? Third, how do these two campaigns 
compare in effectiveness and what lessons can we extract from such a comparison? The 
NGO campaigns are analyzed against a taxonomy for NGO campaign effectiveness, 
developed by Jennifer Chapman and Thomas Fisher (2000). The taxonomy's variables, 
which Chapman and Fisher argue facilitate NGO policy campaign effectiveness, are 
compared to the variables that facilitated the landmine and MAl NGO policy campaigns, 
and the results show that the taxonomy's variables are consistent in both campaigns. 
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MAC= Mines Action Canada 
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NGO = non-governmental organization 
OECD = Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
UN = United Nations 
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U.S. = United States 
USCBL = United States Campaign to Ban Landmines 
USCIB = United States Council for International Business 
TANs = transnational advocacy network 
TRIMs = trade-related investment measures 
VVAF =Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation 
WTO = World Trade Organization 
YMCA = Young Men 's Christian Organization 
4 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................................................... 2 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................................ 3 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 8 
1.1 THE CONTEMPORARY NGO W ORLD ......... ....... ... ..... ......... ..... ..... ..... ..... ............. ................................... ..... 8 
1.2 NGO E FFECTIVENESS ........................... ........................ ..... .............. .. .... ....... ...... ..... .......... ... ........... ......... 1 0 
1.3 C ANA DA, FOREIGN POLICY, AND NGOs .. ... ........ ..... ................................................................ ... ....... ...... ll 
1.4 RESEARCH Q UESTION ..... .. ... .. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... .. ... .. .. ......... .... .. .... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... .............. ............. ..... ..... .. ..... . 12 
CHAPTER 2: CHAPMAN AND FISHERS' TAXONOMY ....................................................................... 14 
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHA PMAN AN D FISHER'S T AXONOMY .. ... ... .. ... ..... ........ ..... .... .. .... .............................. 14 
2.2 CHA PMAN AND FISHERS' V A RIA BLES OF NGO C AMPAIGN EFFECTIVENESS ....... ..... ............... ............. . I4 
Variable 1: Timeline ................ ...... .... .......... ..... ............. ..... ................ ..... ........... ..... .................................. 14 
Variable 2: Concurrent work .. ..... ..... .... .... ..... ..... ...... .......................... ......... ...... ..... ..... ... .. ............ .. ...... .... 15 
Variable 3: Collaboration .... .... ..... ........ ..... ....... ...................... ............... ..... ........ ..... ..... .... ...... ..... ...... ....... 16 
Variable 4: Legitimacy ............ ..... ... ..... ..... ..... ...... ........... .. ... .. ... .. .... .... ..... .... ........... ............... .... .... ........... 17 
Variable 5: Individuals and mobilizing p eople ........................... ..... ........................ ... ... .... .. ...... ..... ......... 18 
Variable 6: Narrow focus ............................... ................. ... ..... ..... ..... .. ..... ....... ... .... ................... ....... .. ..... .. 18 
Variable 7: Role of government and judiciary .................... .. ... .... ... .. ..... .............. .. .................... .. ......... .. . 19 
Variable 8: International context .......................................... ................ ..... .. .... .. ..... ..... ...... ... ............... ..... 19 
Variable 9: Implementation and monitoring ............................................ ..... ........... .............. ....... .... ....... 20 
Variable 10: Too /s ........................................................ ............ ...... .... ....... .... ..... ....... ..... .... .. ...... ... ............. 20 
Variable 11 : Work at the grassroots ............ .. .. .... .... ...... .. .... ........ .. ........................................ .... .. ...... ....... 21 
CHAPTER 3: THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES .................................... 26 
3.1 0RJGINS OF A NTI-LANDMINE CAMPAIGN ........ .. ........ .. ....................................... .. ................... .. .. .. .......... 26 
3.1.1 Evidence of a Landmines Epidemic ...... ..................................... ....... .. ........ ... ... ................. .. ............ 27 
3.2 THE INTERNATIONA L COMMITTEE TO BAN LANDMINES (ICBL) .... .. .. .... ................................................ 29 
3.2. 1 The i CBL 'sActivities ........................................................................ ..... ... .. ...... .. ...................... .. ...... 30 
3.2.2 The ICRC 's Media Campaign to Ban Landmines .......................... .. .... .. .. .... ... .............. ..... ........... . 32 
3.3 THE UN CONVENTION ON C ERTAIN C ONVENTIONA L W EAPONS ............................................................ 34 
3.4 THE CCW REVIEW CON FERENCE OF 1996 ...... .. ............................ .. .. .... ........ .. ............ .. ...................... .... . 36 
3.5 L AN DMINES AND CFP ................ ... ................. .. ... .......... .... ................ .. .. .......... ......... .................................. 37 
3.6 THE OTTAWA PROCESS ........ .. ............................................................. ......................... .. ............ .. ............ .40 
3.7 PROBLEM S ENCOUNTERED AN D OVERCOM E D URING TH E OTTAWA PROCESS .. .... ... ... ..... .. .. .. .. .. .......... .44 
3.8 THE OTTAWA T REATY ..................................................................................... ............................ ............. 45 
3.9 ICBL SUMMA RY .......................... .. ......... .. ................................................... ........ .. ... .. .................... .. ....... ..45 
4.0 A NALYZING TH E CAMPAIGN TO B AN L AN DMINES A GAINST C HAPMAN AN D FISHER'S T AXONOMY ... .47 
CHAPTER 4: THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT (MAI) ............................ 52 
4.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE I NTERNATIONAL NGO C A MPAIGN TO B LOCK TH E MAl ...................... .. ...... .. .. 52 
4.2 0RJGINS ................ ....... .. ....................................... ..... ..... ..... ........................ ........... ................. ................... 53 
4.3 THE MAl N EGOTIATIONS .. ... .. .......... .................................................................... .. ............... .................... 57 
4.3.1Initia/ Planning ......................................... .. .................... .................. ....... ....................... .. ................ 58 
4.3.2 Process ... .. ..... .... ...... .. ....... .... ......... .. ...... ...... ... ....... .. .... .......... ..... , ....... ......... .. ... .................... .... ......... 58 
4.4 THE I NTERNATIONA L NGO C AMPAIGN A GAINST TH E MAI ............ .. .... .. .. .... ...................... .. ................. 60 
4.5 C A MPAIGN STRATEGIES .............................................................................. ...................................... .. ..... . 62 
5 
4.5.1 World Wide Web .... .... ....... ........ .... .................................................................................................... 62 
4.5.2 Email ..... ..... ............. ..... ....... .... .................. ..... ........................................... ............... .................. ... ..... 63 
4.5.3 Media ... .......... .............................................. .... ...... ... .............. .. .. ....... .......... ..... .............. ... ... ............. 63 
4.5.4 Public Demonstrations ... .. .................... ...... ... ..... ........ ...... ............ ............................................. ....... 65 
4.6 MAl NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED ........................ ............... ...................................................................... 65 
4 .7 WHY DID THE MAl NEGOTIATIONS FAIL? ............................................................................................... 68 
4. 7.1 The MAl Negotiators' Perspectives on the Effectiveness of the NGO Campaign ........................ 70 
4.8 THE CANADIAN CONTEXT .. ....................................................................................................................... 71 
4.9 SUMMARY OF THE NGO CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MAl ........................................................................ 72 
5.0 COMPARING THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MAl TO CHAPMAN AND fiSHER'S TAXONOMY ................. 73 
CHAPTER 5: COMPARING THE INTERNATIONAL NGO CAMPAIGNS TO BAN LANDMINES 
AND THE MAl AGAINST CHAPMAN AND FISHER'S TAXONOMY ............................................... 78 
5.1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 78 
Variable 1: Time line .................................................................................................................................. 78 
Variable 2: Concurrent work .... ..................... .................. ....... ... ............ ..... ... .... ..... ..... ...................... ....... 80 
Variable 3: Collaboration ... .... .. ..... ... ........ .. ..... .... ........... ..... ..... ............................... .............. ....... ... ......... 82 
Variable 4: Legitimacy ..... ......................................................................................................................... 84 
Variable 5: individuals and mobilizing people ........................................................................................ 87 
Variable 6: Narrow focus .... .................................................. ....... .. ................................. ...................... ... . 89 
Variable 7: Role of government andjudiciary ......................................................................................... 90 
Variable 8: international context ....... ... ... ... ................ ........ ................ .. .................................................... 92 
Variable 9: implementation and monitoring ... ...................... ... ..... ........... .. .............................................. 95 
Variable 10: Tools ........................ .. ................................................... .. ............ .......... ..... ....................... .. ... 97 
Variable 11 : Work at the grassroots ............................. .. .......................................................................... 98 
5.2 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................ 103 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................................... 106 
6.1 NGO CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVENESS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA .................................................. 1 06 
6.2 NGO CAMPAIGNS AND STATE- L EVEL FOREIGN POLICY ...................................................................... 1 07 
6.3 TH E NATURE OF EFFECTIVE NGO CAMPAIGNS ............................................................................. ........ I08 
6.4 ANALYSIS OF CHAPMAN AND FISHER'S TAXONOMY ............................................................................. 11 0 
6.4.1 Degrees of Variable Significance ................................................................................ .. ................ ]] 0 
6.4.2 Other Variables ..................................................................................................................... .. ........ ill 
6.4.3 The Taxonomy's Utility ...... .. .......................................................................................................... 114 
6.5 THE ICBL AND THE NGO CAMPA IGN AGAINST THE MAl TODAY ...................................................... 115 
6.5.1 The JCBL 2007 .... ............... ............................................... .. ......................................... ................... 115 
6.5.2 The NGO Campaign Against the MA12007 ................................................................................. 11 7 
6.5.3 Summary of the Current NGO Campaigns ............................. .. .................. .. ................................ 119 
6.6 LESSONS LEARNED .................................................................................. ... ............................................. 119 
6. 7 FUTURE AREAS OF STUDY ........... . ........................................................................................................... 120 
6.8 FINAL THOUGHTS .................................................................................................................................... 121 
7.0 REFERENCES ............................................................................. .............................................................. 123 
6 
LIST OF TABLES 
Figure 2.1: The Policy Timeline .................................................................. 15 
Table 2.2: Elements of Concurrent Work ........ .. ............................... ............ .. 16 
Table 2.3: Taxonomy ofNGO Effectiveness ................................................... 21 
Table 3.1 Comparing the Campaign to Ban Landmines to Chapman and Fisher's 
Taxonomy ............... ............. . ..... .. . .... ..... .. ...................................... ..... 47 
Table 4.1 Comparing the Campaign to Block the Signing of the MAl Against Chapman 
and Fisher's Taxonomy ...................................................... ............ .......... 71 
Table 5.1 Comparing the NGO Campaigns to Chapman and Fisher's Taxonomy: 
Summary ... .... . ......... ...... . .... ..... . ......... ...... . .. ................. ........... ........... 100 
7 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Contemporary NGO World 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have a long history, almost 200 years 
(Paul 2000; Simmons 1998). In the early 1800s, British and American citizen 
organizations were driving forces behind the 1840 World Anti-Slavery Convention 
(Simmons 1998). The World Alliance of Young Men' s Christian Associations (YMCAs) 
was founded around the same time (Paul 2000), and the International Committee for the 
Red Cross (ICRC) came into existence between 1859 and 1863 (ICRC 2007). The 
number of internationally operating NGOs expanded after World War 1: there were as 
many as 135 international NGOs around 1910, 375 by 1930, and 427 by 1940 (Iriye 
1999: 422). 
NGOs gained formal recognition in 1945 in Article 71 of Chapter 10 of the 
United Nation's (UN) Charter, which reads as follows: "The Economic and Social 
Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental 
organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence" (United Nations 
2007). Since this time, NGOs have proliferated (McGann and Johnstone 2006); current 
estimates suggest that there are over 40 000 internationally-operating NGOs (United 
Nations 2007). Today there are numerous types of NGOs in the world, working at 
multiple levels - local to global - and differing in goals, memberships, funding sources, 
and activities (Simmons 1998). There are many reasons for the dramatic upsurge in NGO 
numbers, including population increase, more frequent and deeper levels of integration, 
and overall increased organizational complexity in our multi-issued and globalizing 
world. 
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In addition to the great number and variety of NGOs, these organizations are 
engaged in a great number and variety of "campaigns." In general terms, such that it is 
applicable to any level, a campaign is defined as a movement made either by a single 
NGO or a consortium of NGOs which aims to achieve change by encouraging new 
treaties, standards, or institutions. An international campaign is this generic definition 
plus an international component; thus, an international campaign is a movement which 
aims to achieve international change by encouraging new treaties, standards, or 
institutions. In this project, I discuss only international NGO campaigns, and thus in the 
remainder of the project I use the terms 'international NGO campaign' and 'NGO 
campaign' interchangeably. 
NGO campaigns are characterized by many kinds of campaign structures and 
strategies. Campaign structures include coalitions and transnational advocacy networks 
(TANs). NGO campaign strategies include conducting research, promoting policy 
development, raising public awareness, engaging in educational activities, creating 
networks, and providing expertise. 
NGO campaign organizers participate in coalitions, and TANs use a multitude of 
strategies because the process for achieving policy change at the international level is 
highly complex. Policy issues can be simultaneously debated in multiple arenas (in 
government circles, in multilateral organizations, in corporate boardrooms) by a diversity 
of actors (government bureaucrats, diplomats, scientists, academics, lawyers, celebrities, 
and NGO representatives). To be effective, NGO campaigns must themselves operate 
simultaneously in these multiple arenas with these multiple actors. Furthermore, 
mastering technology such as the internet and World Wide Web, interfacing with the 
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mass media, and assimilating the interconnectedness of issues adds to a campaign's 
complexity. In short, NGOs within the context of a given international campaign must 
manage a multitude of tasks at various levels and in many arenas to achieve their desired 
policy outcome. 
There are numerous studies of international NGO campaigns designed to 
influence international policy such as Steve Charnovitz's (1997) detailed history ofNGO 
involvement in international decision making; Wendy Schoener's (1997) and Anne Marie 
Clarke's (1995) investigations of NGO activities and methods in global affairs; P.J. 
Simmons ' ( 1998) analysis of reasons for the rapid increase in and the potential 
limitations of NGO campaigns; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink's (1998; 1999) 
investigations on how NGOs build coalitions and TANs; Margaret G. Hermann's (2001) 
and Joe D. Hagan et al.'s (2001) analyses of how NGOs can contribute to the shaping of 
foreign policy; and Alan Hudson's (2001) investigation of how and why NGOs and 
TANs work. 
1.2 NGO Effectiveness 
One of the key questions that is asked of international NGOs campaigns is: When 
are NGO campaigns effective? A seminal work, by Jennifer Chapman and Thomas 
Fisher's (2000), on NGO campaign effectiveness regards effectiveness in the context of 
NGO campaigns, by a campaign's ability to achieve its objective of an international 
policy change. At the state level, NGO campaign effectiveness is equivalent to a state-
level policy change. Chapman and Fisher deduced a set of variables (a taxonomy) that 
help explain how and why NGO campaigns are effective. Their work (explained in detail 
in Chapter 2) is the basis for my research. 
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While there are numerous examples of NGO campaigns that have met some level 
of success in terms of affecting policy, I was interested in two international NGO 
campaigns that were highly effective in facilitating international policy -- the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the NGO campaign against the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl), and it will be seen that both NGO 
campaigns were effective in affecting international policy change - the NGO campaign 
against landmines culminated in an international treaty; the campaign against the MAl 
resulted in the abandonment of an agreement on multilateral investment. 
1.3 Canada, Foreign Policy, and NGOs 
As already mentioned, there are multitude of international NGO campaigns and 
multiple levels and locations at which these campaigns can take place. One prominent 
level and location at which activity took place relative to the landmine and MAl 
campaigns was the national level in Canada, especially Canadian foreign policymaking. 
My research focuses on these two campaigns and looks closely at this leveVlocation of 
the campaigning. 
Canada had significant involvement in both the landmines and MAl issues. In 
addition, Canada has a reputation for developing meaningful working relationships with 
NGOs (Axworthy and Taylor 1998, Cooper 2001, de Larringa and Sjolander 1998, 
Haddow 2002, Hampson and Oliver 1998, Smith and Smythe 2003, Schaefer 2004, 
Williams 2006). Thus, Canadian foreign policymaking on these issues provides fruitful 
ground for analyzing NGO effectiveness. In both cases, Canada's policy position was 
affected by its relationship with NGOs. This project contributes to this body of work 
because to my knowledge, only two publications have addressed the Canadian venue of 
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landmines and MAl campaigns, Turenne Sjolander and Miguel de Larrinaga (2000) and 
Karen Mingst and Craig Warkentin (2000). Sjolander and de Larrinaga investigated how 
and why the Canadian federal government constructed a relationship with NGOs in these 
two campaigns, and Mingst and Warkentin used the landmines and MAl campaigns to 
examine "the implications of a global civil society and the World Wide Web for NGO 
activity" (Mingst and Warkentin 2000, 237). Neither study directly addresses the issue of 
NGO campaign effectiveness. 
1.4 Research Question 
This project asks three central questions: How and why were NGO campaigns to 
ban landmines and the campaign against the MAl effective in achieving their desired 
outcomes? Second, how and why were NGOs effective in influencing Canadian foreign 
policy on landmines and the MAl? Third, how do these two campaigns compare m 
effectiveness and what lessons can we extract from such a comparison? 
As already mentioned, NGO campaign effectiveness is defined m terms of 
achieving international policy change. In the case of the landmine campaign, the 
international policy change was the successful creation of a landmine treaty. In the case 
of the MAl campaign, it was the failure of the MAl negotiation process. 
These questions are answered in forthcoming chapters as follows. In Chapter 2, 
Chapman and Fisher's taxonomy of variables contributing to NGO campaign 
effectiveness is presented. Chapters 3 and 4 contain the chronologies of the landmine and 
MAl campaigns, each with a focus on CFP. Each chronology is analyzed, using Chapman 
and Fisher's taxonomy, to determine the reasons why NGOs were effective in influencing 
Canadian foreign policy on these issues. In Chapter 5 the two campaigns are compared. 
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In Chapter 6, the results of the comparison are used as the basis for extracting lessons on 
NGO effectiveness. In addition, I comment on various deficiencies in Chapman and 
Fisher's taxonomy as revealed by my case study analysis. Finally, a discussion of further 
areas of study is presented. With this outline in place we can move to the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: CHAPMAN AND FISHER'S TAXONOMY 
2.1 Introduction to Chapman and Fisher's Taxonomy 
In my research, I use Chapman and Fisher' s (2000) taxonomy of variables to 
investigate the effectiveness of NGOs generally and more specifically in context to 
Canadian foreign policy. In the original article, Chapman and Fisher analyzed two long-
running international campaigns-the campaign to promote breast feeding in Ghana and 
the campaign against the use of child labour in the carpet industry in India, both of which 
met some success in respect to changing government policy. Based on their case studies, 
they derived a list of eleven variables that influenced campaign effectiveness, and 
postulated that these are generic variables applicable to other case studies. The variables 
are: (1) timelines, (2) concurrent work, (3) collaboration, ( 4) legitimacy, (5) individuals 
and mobilization of groups, (6) narrow focus, (7) role of government and judiciary, (8) 
international context, (9) implementation and monitoring, (10) tools, and (11) grassroots 
involvement. Each is discussed below. 
2.2 Chapman and Fisher's Variables ofNGO Campaign Effectiveness 
Variable 1: Timeline 
The longer a campaign the greater the likelihood it will be effective. The outcome 
of a campaign rarely depends on a single variable or event; rather, the cumulative effect 
of campaigning over time can lead to "precipitative moments" (156) which may change 
policy and practice. Thus, the longer a campaign, the more likely a precipitiative moment 
can be achieved. A hypothetical policy time-line is shown in Figure 2.1. 
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The timeline is simplistic because real life campaigns do not necessarily finish 
one stage before moving into the next. Instead, NGOs adapt as an issue changes, progress 
goes faster in some arenas than in others, and a campaign can be at different stages at 
different levels (e.g., international and national) and in different locations. Chapman and 
Fisher argue that campaigns are not linear and do not have defined beginnings or endings, 
and a long timescale is needed to achieve real change (157). 
Variable 2: Concurrent work 
To be effective, an NGO campaign must engage in concurrent work at many 
different levels (e.g., international, national, grassroots), and in different arenas (e.g. , 
within the NGO world, with multilateral organizations, and within foreign policymaking 
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circles) (157). It is not necessary for NGO campaigns to be involved in all of the areas 
simultaneously, but campaign organizers must decide what arenas, what partnerships, 
what activities, and so forth will be most effective for advancing their agenda at different 
times (157). In other words, they must decide what concurrent work to engage in to be 
effective. Table 2.1 shows some of the arenas and elements of concurrent work. 
Table 2.1: Elements of Concurrent Work 
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Variable 3: Collaboration 
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NGO policy campaigns are effective when NGOs simultaneously participate in 
partnerships with policymakers and in advocacy campaigns outside of policy arenas. In 
other words, effective NGO campaigns facilitate collaboration between different types of 
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organizations. Chapman and Fisher argued that to achieve policy change, an NGO 
campaign needs to use both "outsider" strategies (i .e., various NGOs collaborate to lobby 
against targets such as departments of a federal governments and "insider" strategies (i.e., 
NGOs work with target actors such government bureaucrats) although the campaign will 
be predominately characterized by one or the other (158). Collaboration between policy 
actors can take on different forms to help move a campaign forward. 
Collaborations usually take on one of three forms: pyramid, wheel, or web ( 158). 
The pyramid has a coordinating secretariat that sends and receives information vertically; 
the wheel has one or more focal points with information flowing in and out and also 
directly between members; and the web has no focal point and information flows to and 
from all organizations relatively equally (158). Additional players in a campaign can 
make cooperation more complex, and NGOs working with different strategies in different 
arenas can lead to conflict, especially when NGO campaign styles differ (158). 
Variable 4: Legitimacy 
NGOs must establish and maintain their legitimacy to be effective, and they 
should contest the legitimacy of their opponents (159). In fact, all actors in a campaign, 
both NGOs and their targets, spend time and energy establishing and maintaining their 
legitimacy and contesting that of their opponents (159) . Five bases are used to legitimize 
NGO campaign work: practical experience on the ground; the promotion of a particular 
value which is widely recognized and/or enshrined in international law; knowledge and 
research; the promotion of democratic principles and practice; and alliances and networks 
(159). There may be competition between NGOs over funds, and most NGOs draw on a 
variety ofthe bases to legitimize their campaign work (159). 
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Variable 5: Individuals and mobilizing people 
Individual leaders and mobilized citizens are both critical to NGO campatgn 
effectiveness (159). Individual champions can play key roles in campaigning and 
achieving policy change, especially those combining social conscience and a strategic 
vision. At the later stages of a campaign, however, a few key people are rarely enough to 
affect a policy change. Thus, a key issue is how to mobilize people for the lengthy 
timescale that is required to achieve a policy change (159). Some ways that a campaign' s 
membership can be strengthened include providing people with active roles, recognizing 
their contributions, developing concrete tools to allow concrete changes, and recognising 
campaign successes as they happen ( 161 ). 
Variable 6: Narrow focus 
A focussed or narrow campatgn mcreases the likelihood of campatgn 
effectiveness (161). 'Narrow' refers to a single, clearly defined, policy objective. Some 
advantages of a narrow focus are that it makes clear the target of the campaign, it can 
make people distant from the situation feel they can do something, and it can work as a 
communication tool (161). Furthermore, having a narrow focus can be useful when NGO 
campaign organizers are formulating an issue and it can help campaign organizers ensure 
that concrete progress along an NGO campaign timeline is made. Sometimes a narrow 
focus can be broadened to tackle wider issues and causes (161). For instance, at some 
point on a NGO campaign timeline, a narrow policy goal of banning the use of a weapon 
could be broadened to also include a ban on manufacturing and selling it. Therefore, a 
narrow focus can be adapted to include somewhat wider issues and causes. However, a 
narrow focus can oversimplify and distract from a wider problem or deeper causes, it can 
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target response too narrowly, it can make involvement in grassroots harder, and it can 
undermine civil society in nascent democracies ( 161 ). 
Variable 7: Role of government and judiciary 
Local, national, and international law can play crucial roles in an NGO 
campaign's effectiveness (161). For example, established laws can be used to promote an 
NGO campaign' s legitimacy and new laws can help make policy changes concrete. At 
some point along an effective NGO campaign's timeline, government bureaucrats and 
lawmakers are involved, in order to get a legal framework in place, ensure that a law is 
implemented, raise funds for large programmes that NGOs could not afford 
independently, change attitudes and practice in government institutions, and give 
permanency to issues by enshrining them in law (161). In other words, NGO campaigns 
need to use judiciaries to advance their campaign objectives. 
Variable 8: International context 
The international context of an NGO campaign can influence its effectiveness 
(162). The following international factors can help an NGO policy campaign: 
collaboration between NGOs from different countries, enforcement of international 
conventions, and coverage of an issue in the international media (162). Collaboration 
between northern and southern NGOs can, for example, be useful in moving a campaign 
along its timeline in various arenas (162). In addition, an NGO campaign can benefit 
from another campaign' s experience and knowledge. International conventions can help 
NGO policy campaigns press for change. Lastly, international media can play a more 
significant role than national media in influencing government policy. 
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Variable 9: Implementation and monitoring 
To be effective, NGO campaigns must work to make sure implementation and 
monitoring procedures are in place and they themselves might even have a part in this 
( 163). Achieving policy is not the end: organizations such as governments and 
corporations can renege on or ignore policies (163). NGOs want concrete evidence that a 
policy change has occurred and is being enforced. NGOs, for the most part, play the role 
of watchdog in the implementation and monitoring of new policies, but they can also 
work to empower grassroots to monitor policies on the ground and work to publicize 
policy violators (163). 
Variable 10: Tools 
Chapman and Fisher (2000) argued, "Campaigning on an issue is not enough if 
effective tools for making change are not promoted as well" (163). Whereas legislation or 
conventions were often seen as the primary goal of such work, Chapman and Fisher 
suggest that other campaign tools are also being developed. Such tools include the use of 
codes of conduct, labelling, and social auditing, especially when neither national 
legislation nor international conventions exist, or are too weak, too broad or unspecific, 
or when their implementation through the legal system or government is problematic 
(163). However, Chapman and Fisher identified two possible problems with using these 
tools. First, disagreements may arise between NGOs with different ideas about which 
tools to use, in which arenas to use them, and about how they should be administered 
(163). Second, to fool the public, opponents may try to use similar tools (against NGOs) 
for their own ends (163). 
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Variable 11: Work at the grassroots 
Grassroots involvement is key for NGO campaign effectiveness in respect to 
setting agendas, building campaign momentum, and ensuring real and sustained change 
(163). Individuals and organizations at the grassroots level need to feel committed to the 
NGO campaign so that they feel a sense of ownership of the NGO campaign and its 
policy goals (163). Work at the grassroots level connects and contributes to the other 
levels, and grassroots level commitment to the NGO campaign can result in the 
grassroots affecting change (163). In fact, support from individuals and organizations at 
the grassroots level facilitates the transfer of policy-to-practice through project work 
(163). 
2.3 Summary 
This chapter outlines Chapman and Fisher's variable taxonomy. To aid in clarity 
for the reader, Table 2.3 provides a summary of the taxonomy. This taxonomy will be 
used in the next two chapters to analyze the effectiveness of NGOs in influencing 
Canadian foreign policy in the landmine and MAl campaigns, respectively. The landmine 
campaign follows the table of the taxonomy. 
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Table 2.3: Taxonomy of NGO Effectiveness 
Variable How variable contributes to NGO campaign effectiveness 
1. Timeline Campaigning over time may lead to precipitative moments which 
may have a major impact in terms of change in policy and practice. 
• Campaigns are not linear and do not have defined beginnings 
or endings. 
• Campaigns are likely to be simultaneously at different stages 
(timeline) at different levels in different locations. 
• There is a cumulative effect of campaigning over time . 
2. Concurrent To be effective, work has to be conducted at many different levels 
work and, within these, in different arenas and with different actors. 
• In order to bring about change, it is not enough to target one 
sector, actor, or set of actors. 
• It is important to select the arena which will be most effective 
in moving the campaign forward. 
3. To campaign effectively, a mix of "insider" and "outsider" strategies 
Collaboration are needed although the overall strategy of each NGO remains 
characterized predominately by one or the other. The conditions 
surrounding a campaign often determine which strategy is used. 
• As more players become involved, cooperation becomes more 
complex, which can lead to conflicts; however, 
• Collaboration between different organizations can help move a 
campaign forward. 
4. Legitimacy Legitimacy is essential for effective campaigning and for raising 
resources. 
• All actors in a campaign, both NGOs and their targets, spend 
time and energy establishing and maintaining their legitimacy 
and contesting that of their opponents. 
• There may be competition between NGOs over funds . 
• Most NGOs draw from a variety of bases for legitimizing their 
campaign work; all are likely to be challenged by their 
opponents. 
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Variable How variable contributes to NGO campaign effectiveness 
(continued) (continued) 
5. Individuals Specific individuals, who have a flair for motivating people and who 
and mobilizing have a combined social conscience and strategic vision, are crucial to 
people the process at both the national and grassroots level. 
• Individuals are important at the national level in getting an 
issue onto the agenda, and at the grassroots level in ensuring 
real change. 
• At a campaign' s later stages, a few individuals are not 
sufficient; mobilizing people around a campaign issue is 
critical to achieving a greater impact on the national and 
grassroots levels. 
• To mobilize people over a length of time, they should be given 
an active role, recognition for their contributions, opportunities 
to develop their practical skills to allow concrete change, and 
recognition of successes along the way. 
6. Narrow A narrow focus can be extremely effective in getting an issue 
focus formulated and in ensuring progress. 
• Moves national and international campaigns forward, works as 
a communication tool, makes people distant from a situation 
feel that they can do something, and helps to identify a target. 
• A narrow focus does not necessarily hinder the widening of a 
campaign at a later stage. 
• However, a narrow focus can oversimplify and distract from a 
wider problem or deeper causes, it can target response too 
narrowly, it can make involvement in grassroots harder, and it 
can undermine civil society in nascent democracies. 
7. Role of Governments, national law, and international conventions need to be 
government involved to get legal frameworks in place, ensure the law is 
and judiciary implemented, carry out large programmes for which NGOs cannot 
raise the necessary resources, change practice and attitudes in 
government-run institutions, and give permanency. 
• Some cooperation with government is necessary if it is to 
support the aims of the campaign. 
• Some governments actively seek change . 
23 
Variable How variable contributes to NGO campaign effectiveness 
(continued) (continued) 
8. International The international context of an NGO campaign can influence its 
context effectiveness: collaboration between NGOs from different 
counties, international conventions, and coverage of an issue in the 
international media. 
• Collaboration between Northern and Southern NGOs is 
useful in moving a campaign forward. 
• A campaign benefits greatly from experience and 
knowledge gained from similar campaigns in other 
countries. 
• International conventions are useful tools to press for 
change within countries. 
• International media can play a big role as international 
coverage can have more significance to some governments 
than does national media. 
9. Implementation The effectiveness of an NGO campaign is dependent on the 
and monitoring implementation and monitoring of a policy. 
• Achieving policy is not the end; organizations such as 
governments and corporations can renege on or ignore 
policies. 
• Work is needed to ensure that policies and laws are 
implemented. 
• International codes have to be constantly monitored and 
violations publicized. 
10. Tools In addition to legislation and conventions, other tools are being 
developed, such as codes of conduct, labelling, and social 
auditing; these seem to be appropriate when either national 
legislation or international conventions do not exist, or are too 
weak, too broad or unspecific, or when it is problematic to 
implement them through the legal system or government. 
• Disagreements may arise between NGOs with different 
ideas about which tools to use, in which arenas to use 
them, and about how they should be administered. 
• Opponents may try to use similar tools for their own ends . 
24 
Variable How variable contributes to NGO campaign effectiveness 
(continued) (continued) 
11. Work at the Grassroots involvement is essential to ensuring real and sustained 
grassroots change. 
• Grassroots involvement aids in the setting of agendas, 
building campaign momentum, and ensuring real and 
sustained change. 
• Individuals and organizations at the grassoots level need to 
develop a sense of ownership over the NGO campaign. 
• Work at the grassroots level connects and contributes to other 
levels. 
• A link is shown between policy and project work. 
• Long-term work at the grassroots level is needed even after 
policy changes have been achieved (policy-to-practice). 
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CHAPTER 3: THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES 
In early December 1997, representatives of 122 states came to Ottawa to sign the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines (APMs) and on their Destruction (English 1998; Axworthy and Taylor 
1998), which is otherwise known as the Ottawa Treaty, the Ottawa Convention or the 
Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). 
The MBT is an example of how NGO campaigns can be effective in achieving a 
policy change (Axworthy 1997; Chretien 1997; Sjolander and de Larrinaga 1997; English 
1998). It is also widely accepted amongst policy makers and NGOs that the Ottawa 
Process is an example of how Canadian foreign policy can be democratized for a specific 
issue and offers insights into how NGOs can lobby, influence, and cooperate with 
government departments and leaders to achieve an international policy change (Axworthy 
1998; English 1998; Tomlin 1997). Thus, the MBT is an excellent case study for 
examining NGO effectiveness. 
3.1 Origins of Anti-Landmine Campaign 
The NGO campatgn to ban landmines started in the early 1990s with the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) trying to springboard landmines onto 
the global foreign policy agenda within the context of international humanitarian law 
(IHL) (English 1998; Grisdale 1999; Lynch 1999; Marslen 1998; Sjolander and de 
Larrinaga 1997). Stuart Maslen (1998), an ICRC analyst, states that IHL regulates the 
conduct of warfare and minimizes the suffering inflicted on civilians and combatants 
alike (81) . However, there are differing viewpoints on the use of landmines as a military 
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weapon. Military officials argued that the military utility of landmines was more 
important than the humanitarian costs, which were vague in terms of statistics. For 
example, Robert G. Guard Jr. (1998) argued, "There [was] no formula or specific set of 
criteria on which to base a determination of the point at which the putative military utility 
of APMs is exceeded by the humanitarian costs of their employment" (138). Therefore, 
the initial members of the NGO campaign against landmines were faced with the task of 
taking a weapon of war that most militaries, including Canada, considered an 
" indispensable instrument of war" (Sjolander and de Larrinaga 1997, 40; see also 
Grisdale 1999) and re-contextualizing it in the framework of the humanitarian toll that 
they enact. 
3.1.1 Evidence of a Landmines Epidemic 
In the late 1980s, ICRC surgeons documented the scourge of landmine victims in 
Mozambique, Cambodia, Angola, Afghanistan and several other countries mired in 
internal conflicts. The ICRC surgeons began to keep track of the landmine victims in 
photographs and videos that showed how landmines killed and maimed their innocent 
victims (English 1998; Sjolander and de Larrinaga 1997; International Committee of the 
Red Cross 1995). For example, the joint 1991 publication, Landmines in Cambodia: The 
Coward 's War, by Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights reported on the horror 
created by landmines in post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia. The main victims of landmines 
were argued to be farmers and other civilians trying to reclaim their lives in post-conflict 
areas. (Chabasse 1998, 60). In 1992, Physicians for Human Rights published, Hidden 
Enemies: Landmines in Northern Somalia, which also argued that the victims of 
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landmines are principally civilians, and they are often women and children (Physicians 
for Human Rights 1991 ). In 1992, the ICRC also published 'powerful and shocking' 
pictures of landmine victims in Mines, a Perverse Use of Technology (Maslen 1998, 84). 
The daily reality of living in "the field" exemplified the enormous human suffering 
caused by landmines and these reports brought this daily horror to the attention of global 
leaders (Maslen 1998). 
These reports, in addition to the case evidence provided by the ICRC surgeons, 
showed that the indiscriminate nature of APMs resulted in civilians, including farmers, 
women, and children, as well as soldiers being subjected to an array of physical 
punishments: triggering a mine could result in the loss of a limb(s), disfiguration, various 
shrapnel related injuries, blindness, or death as a result of blood loss (International 
Committee to Ban Landmines; Sinclair 1999). The message was that mines are designed 
to maim, not kill (International Committee to Ban Landmines). Asia Watch and 
Physicians for Human Rights used their publication to call - for the first time - the five 
permanent members of the Security Council to press all warring parties to stop laying 
new mines (Sinclair 1999, 3). The photographic, anecdotal, medical, and statistical data 
collected by the surgeons helped provide the impetus for initiating a campaign against 
APMs. For example, The Coward 's War was sent to all French and Belgian legislators 
and to the European Parliament, and it motivated the President of the European 
Parliament and two Belgian senators to become involved in the issue (Chabasse 1998, 
61). In 1990s, convinced by his staff the president of the ICRC, Cornelio Sommaruga, 
went beyond the traditional mandate of the ICRC to call for a "total ban on the 
production, export, and use of anti-personnel mines" (English 1998, 27; International 
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Committee of the Red Cross 1995, 667). In addition to the work being done at the 
international level, there was also work being done at the state-level. 
3.2 The International Committee to Ban Landmines (ICBL) 
In the early 1990s, additional support to ban landmines came from the United 
States (US). The Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), which had been 
created by anti-war activists, had close links with some Democratic Senators (Wareham 
1998, 213) and some prominent musical artists like Emmylou Harris (the founder of the 
group of musicians who participated in the Concerts for a Mine Free World series), Bruce 
Springstein, Bruce Cockburn, Sheryl Crow, and Willie Nelson, who also had links to 
Democrats (Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation). The VVAF is an influential 
NGO in terms of its links to American policymakers, and its associates used these 
political connections to get landmines onto the US foreign policy agenda. During a trip to 
Cambodia, ever-present amputees left a strong impression on Robert 'Bobby' Muller, the 
VV AF's president. Upon his return, Muller aggressively pursued the landmines issue and 
persuaded Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont to first, set up a fund to aid mine victims 
and secondly, to introduce in the Senate legislation to ban American exports of landmines 
for one year (English 1998; Rutherford 2004). President George Bush Sr. agreed to the 
request and signed the bill on October 23, 1992; the amendment also called on the US to 
"seek veritable international agreements prohibiting the sale, transfer, or export, and 
further limiting the use, production, possession, and deployment of antipersonnel 
landmines" (Wareham 1998, 214). John English (1998) suggested that the American 
initiative raised hopes that there would be support for a complete ban in the US. 
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In order to build momentum for the anti-landmine movement, Muller linked his 
organisation (the VVAF) with the German group, Medico International, and in November 
1991 hired a well-known NGO activist, Jody Williams, to organise the campaign. The 
campaign' s formal organization occurred in the October of 1992 (International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines, Campaign history; Williams 1997), and by the end of that year the 
campaign became the International Committee to Ban Landmines (ICBL) (English 1998; 
Rutherford 2004). The other founding members of the ICBL were Handicap International 
(France), Human Rights Watch, Mines Advisory Group (United Kingdom), Physicians 
for Human Rights, Medico International, and the VV AF (International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines, Campaign history) . The ICBL defmed itself as "a flexible network of 
organizations that share common objectives" and its focus was the call "for an 
international ban on the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel 
landmines, and for increased international resources for humanitarian mine clearance and 
mine victim assistance program" (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Campaign 
history). In 1993, the original six organizations formed the Campaign Steering 
Committee (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Keeping up With the Times). In 
addition, dozens of national campaigns were started and hundreds of organizations from 
around the world joined the campaign against landmines. 
3.2.1 The ICBL 's Activities 
Under the unified call for the elimination of landmines, individual NGOs were 
free to engage groups or governments with their strategies of choice (Wapner 2004, 255) . 
It is interesting that although public awareness campaigns were key strategies, the NGOs 
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were ultimately focussed on lobbying state-level policymakers. For example, in Europe, 
NGOs worked closely with a core group of small and medium-sized states who all had "a 
progressive stance on international aid and related security issues and were secure from 
threats to their borders": Denmark, Norway, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands 
(Mingst and Warkentin 2000, 246). The NGO lobby for a complete ban was congruent 
with the states' own policies (only Belgium was producing landmines at the time) 
(Mingst and Warkentin 2000, 246). Of the most influential European states, Germany 
was the first to join the ban movement, and although initially reluctant, the UK and 
France also joined (Long and Hindle 1998, 254). Both France and the UK took strong 
positions on mines only after new governments had been elected (Dolan and Hunt 1998; 
Mingst and Warkentin 2000). 
In the United States, NGOs continued to push landmine policy towards a ban by 
lobbying and collaborating with policymakers. President Bill Clinton, in an address to the 
UN General Assembly in 1994, called for quick action to ban landmines. John English 
(1998) stated that Clinton's State Department supported the ICBL with a report, Hidden 
Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines (1993), which gave the widely-
cited figure of 22 000 yearly victims of landmines (English 1998, 29; United States 
Department of State 1993, 2). The publication of Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine 
Crisis (1994) and Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis (1998) further pushed 
Clinton's landmine agenda. 
In Canada, the NGO coalition, Mines Action Canada (MAC), had been formed in 
March 1995 and had registered as a member of the ICBL (Tuttle and Warmington 1998). 
MAC disseminated information to the Canadian public and lobbied the Canadian 
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government. MAC sent a series of information packages on the anti-landmine campaign 
to all Members of Parliament (MPs) between June and August of 1995 (Tuttle and 
Warmington 1998). In addition, Canadian musicians Bruce Cockburn and Mozambican 
singer Chude Mondale went on tour across Canada to raise landmine awareness (Tuttle 
and Warmington 1998). Upon their return, Cockburn handed petitions demanding 
"meaningful action on landmines" signed by thousands of Canadians to Liberal MP Jane 
Stewart who was in support of a ban (Tuttle and Warmington 1998, 52). In addition to 
Stewart, "MPs Keith Martin, Svend Robinson, Bill Blakey, and others questioned 
Canada' s position on landmines daily" (Tuttle and Warmington 1998, 52). 
In addition to targeting state-level policymakers, the ICBL made an effort to 
engage rebel groups, insurgents, and other non-governmental armed combatants (groups 
the ICBL recognized as a driving force behind landmine use) in discussions to persuade 
them that landmines, while seemingly useful in the short term, are damaging to an 
organization ' s long-term goals (Wapner 2004). 
These are a sampling of the hundreds of activities that NGOs of the ICBL used to 
advance their ban landmines agenda along its timeline. One NGO strategy that 
particularly represents the ICBL' s activities is the ICRC's media campaign. 
3.2.2 The ICRC's Media Campaign to Ban Landmines 
Having already positioned itself as a leader in the effort to ban landmines, the 
ICRC worked alongside and as a member of the ICBL. On November 22, 1995, 
Sommaruga launched the ICRC' s international media campaign to ban landmines with 
the declaration: "Landmines must be stopped ... in every hour which passes, three people 
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will be killed or crippled for life by these mmes . . . It can and must be ended" 
(International Committee ofthe Red Cross 1995, 667-668). Sommaruga was joined in his 
appeal by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and a group of Nobel Peace laureates including 
Mairead Maguire, Lech Walesa, Oscar Arias Sanchez, Elie Wiesel, the Dalai Lama, and 
Aung San Suu Kyi (International Committee of the Red Cross 1995, 667-668). Tutu 
emphasized that the "dictates of public conscience would be instrumental in finding a 
solution" to the landmines issue (Maresca and Maslen 2000, 404). Sommaruga (1995) 
stated that the ICRC, in response to the lack of political will that was being exercised to 
ban landmines, would make the campaign to ban landmines international through 
distributed print, television, and radio information ( 404). 
The ICRC lobbied the international community with an educational anti-landmine 
campaign. The ICRC's goal was to reinterpret landmines from being a legitimate weapon 
of war in the arsenals of sovereign states to an illegitimate enemy lying in wait for its 
human victims. The campaign's goal was to stigmatize the production, stockpiling, and 
use of landmines, particularly before the sessions of the Review Conference of the UN 
Weapons Convention that took place in January and April of 1996 (Sjolander and de 
Larringa 1997, 40; International Committee of the Red Cross 1995, 668; Grisdale 1999). 
One memorable international anti-landmine campaign was advertised on T -shirts, 
stickers and posters. It featured a simple drawing of a white flower growing out of a 
landmine with a red skull and crossbones printed on it: a human hand reaches for the 
flower. The copy says, "If you have survived the war, try to survive the peace," a quote 
by Melisa Dzanovic, at the time a 14 year old survivor of the conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Landmines Survivors Fund 2006; Canadian Landmine Foundation 2006). 
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Another well-publicized image from the educational campaign was a crudely drawn, 
chalk outline of a grimacing boy. He is balanced on his one remaining leg while holding 
out a pair of arms, one missing - on the same side as the missing leg - a hand and 
forearm (Landmines Survivors Fund). 
During its media campaign, the ICRC used a quasi-official status to argue against 
the military use of landmines by publishing a series of reports showing that the military 
benefit was far outweighed by the tens of thousands of innocent civilians who were their 
victims (English 1998; Anderson 2000). The campaign had two major results: first, 
policymakers were shown that there was popular support for a ban on landmines, and 
second, the IHL argument was made dramatically clear (English 1998; Anderson 2000). 
Ultimately, the ICRC's media campaign helped set the UN's policy agenda for the 
forthcoming review of its landmines policies. 
3.3 The UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
Existing legislation around landmines was ineffective at preventing landmines 
from being manufactured or deployed. The UN Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (CCW), of which the Second Protocol dealt with the 'Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-raps, and Other Devices' was established in 
1980; it was the first treaty regulating conventional weapons since the 1920s (Mathews 
2001, 996). The CCW was designed to be a dynamic treaty "with the facility to evolve in 
response to weapons developments and within a changing international climate" 
(Mathews 2001, 1009). However, Herby and Maslen (1998) argued that the protocol 
added little "to existing customary law governing weaponry and its provisions were all 
too often unknown or ignored by belligerents involved in later armed conflicts" (694). As 
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well, it was felt by NGOs such as the ICRC and Handicap International that in the 
negotiation of the Protocol military considerations had been given greater priority than 
humanitarian concerns (Mathews 2001, 996). The ICRC's Ryan Mathews (2001) argued 
that the CCW needed strengthening through "greater universality, measures to encourage 
and monitor adherence to its provisions (including compliance-monitoring procedures), 
extended scope (to include internal armed conflict), and coverage of other weapons by 
specific protocols" (1009). For Handicap International, the Protocol II of the CCW 
represented a compromise between humanitarian concerns and military needs. This 
implicitly admitted the use of landmines, which Handicap International and the ICRC 
considered illegal under international law (Handicap International 2001 , 6). 
Handicap International convinced the French government to call upon the UN 
Secretary-General to convene a conference to review the 1980 CCW Protocol II that 
applied to landmines. Four meetings of governmental experts were held to prepare for the 
Review Conference of the CCW (Dolan and Hunt 1998; Maresca and Maslen 2000). The 
ICRC was invited to prepare a report outlining what it felt states needed to address within 
the CCW framework (Maresca and Maslen 2000, 266). During the final meetings, the 
ICRC made the following significant proposals: a prohibition on the use of anti-personnel 
mines; a ban on the manufacture, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel mines and 
non-detectable anti-vehicle mines; an obligation to destroy stockpiles; and a requirement 
upon parties to a conflict to take certain action for the safety of humanitarian workers and 
activities (Maresca and Maslen 2000, 266). Past Secretary General of the United Nations, 
Boutros Boutras-Ghali (1994), stated that although landmines began as a military tool, 
they had become "an ongoing humanitarian disaster" (8). Therefore, NGOs used 
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evidence of human casualties to urge governments to change their policy positions on 
landmines. 
3.4 The CCW Review Conference of 1996 
The CCW Review discussions began in Vienna in September 1995 and dragged 
on for over a year (English 1998; Long and Hindle 1997). Jill Sinclair, a Canadian 
government official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who specializes in disarmament 
issues stated in an interview with Debbie Grisdale (1999) that the CCW review meetings 
were intended to strengthen the guidelines for how to use landmines responsibly, "as long 
as you could mark and map them, and clean up after laying them" (par. 6). According to 
Sinclair, Canada wanted the CCW rules to apply in internal conflicts as well as 
international ones, but "Non-Aligned countries didn't like that" (Grisdale 1999, par. 6). 
There were also disputes over time frames, and governments believed that 
technologically improved mines that could self-destruct or self-neutralize were a solution 
(Grisdale 1999). 
The ICRC, as an expert observer participant, argued strongly for a complete ban 
as did the ICBL advocates. Sinclair states, "[NGOs] told delegates, 'You are addressing 
the wrong issue ... Whatever you do about strengthening the CCW is not going to deal 
with the humanitarian crisis"' (Grisdale 1999, par. 7). In order to help shift the 
governments' thinking, Sinclair reported that the NGOs set up booths, fake minefields, 
and talked to delegates as they came out of meetings. The CCW, on Canada's 
recommendation, suspended the meetings to see if they could reconvene at a later date 
and possibly make more significant progress (Grisdale 1999). The ICRC blamed the 
failure of the meetings to achieve a consensus on the "overtly technical nature of many of 
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the proposals" and an "unwillingness on the part of many States to place significant limits 
on landmines" to achieve the Conference's humanitarian goals (Maresca and Maslen 
2000, 394). 
About a month after the CCW Review Conference had ended, Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Andre Ouellet, made an offhand comment about being in favour of the total 
elimination of landmines (Grisdale 1999); his speech was captured by the Toronto Star 's 
Allan Thompson and published (Grisdale 1999). The NGO campaign, in tum, used the 
publication of Ouellet's speech to put pressure onto the Canadian government to shift its 
foreign policy agenda towards taking a leadership role in the campaign to ban landmines 
(Grisdale 1999). The ICBL felt that state-level leadership could move the campatgn 
forward, and in 1996 Canada's foreign policy position on landmines shifted. 
3.5 Landmines and CFP 
Andre Ouellet had been working on changing Canada's foreign policy position on 
landmines before the CCW Review Conference. In fact, Ouellet initially championed the 
landmines issue in 1995 when he addressed Parliament saying: "[Landmines] should be 
banned not only from Canada but everywhere in the world" (Tomlin 1998, 8). However, 
his remarks were not received favourably by David Collenette, the Canadian Defence 
Minister, who responded with the "standard Department of National Defense (DND) 
argument that land mines could not be eliminated until effective and humane alternatives 
were found" (Tomlin 1998, 8). Ouellet, encouraged by his Senior Policy Advisor, 
Michael Pearson, proposed to Collenette that Canada destroy its stocks of mines as a way 
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of taking a lead on the issue (Tomlin 1998); however, Ouellet had no success, and thus 
changed tactics. 
Furthermore, in early 1995, the US asked Canada to co-sponsor a resolution to the 
UN First Committee calling for a moratorium on the export of mines (Tomlin 1998). 
Earlier, the United Nations (UN) Secretary General had accidentally included Canada on 
a list citing states that adhered to an export moratorium on landmines (Tomlin 1998; 
English 1998). Canada had not signed a landmines treaty, but Ouellet used the situation 
to urge Collenette to at least meet the commitments outlined in the Secretary General's 
report (Tomlin 1998). However, Collenette was advised to reject Ouellet's proposal as it 
was felt by DND officials that the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
(DF AIT) was trying to give them "the thin edge of the wedge" in an effort to control 
weapon's policy (Tomlin 1998, 8). 
Ouellet was running out of patience with Collenette. Upon returning from the 
CCW conference in Vienna in September 1995, Ouellet wrote a letter to Collenette 
stating that he intended to announce a Canadian moratorium on exports of 1andmines, that 
he wanted to co-sponsor the resolution in the US, and that he wanted to declare Canada 's 
commitment to the eventual total elimination of 1andmines (Tomlin 1997). On November 
12, 1995, Collenette reluctantly agreed to an export moratorium on APMs, but insisted on 
behalf of the DND that it was as far as policy changes would go. Collenette had little 
choice but to give in; English argued that "[DND] agreed that the embarrassment of 
pointing out the UN error was unthinkable and, reluctantly, consented to an export ban" 
(Tomlin 1997, 30), 
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Canada was officially committed to an export moratorium, but Ouellet wanted to 
pursue a complete ban on landmines. On November 9, 1995, Ouellet told a Canadian 
Broadcast Corporation (CBC) reporter "Canada should destroy its stockpile of landmines 
and declare a total ban on the production, export, and use of the weapons" (Tomlin 1997, 
9). Later in the month, DND agreed, in principle, to a comprehensive Canadian 
moratorium on the export as well as on the production and use of APMs, and on January 
16, 1996 DF AIT was able to announce the comprehensive moratorium plus support for a 
complete ban on the production, transfer and use of landmines (Tomlin 1997,1 0). Tomlin 
(1997) argued that the policy "window" had opened and the landmines issue was now 
entrenched on the Canadian government' s agenda (10). 
At the end of January 1996, Andre Ouellet retired and was replaced by Lloyd 
Axworthy as Foreign Affairs Minister (English 1998). Ouellet's Senior Policy Advisor, 
Michael Pearson stayed on through the transition, and provided "important continuity on 
land mines" (Tomlin 1997, 11). Thus Canada had a new Minister of Foreign Affairs, a 
desire to enter into suitable foreign policy initiatives, and a recent history of being in a 
public position against landmines. "Axworthy, guided by Pearson and seeing an 
opportunity to run with an issue, picked landmines as an immediate priority" (Tomlin 
1997, 11). Axworthy asked the Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament 
Division (IDA) to extend the moratorium and pressed DND to agree to destroy Canada's 
stockpile of mines (Tomlin 1997). 
By March 1996, IDA had drafted a Canadian Action Plan to Reduce the Global 
Use of Landmines that offered two ideas on how Canada could proceed with its landmine 
agenda. The first idea was for Canada to continue to participate in the CCW Review 
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Conference; however, it was felt by the Canadians that it would not result in any new 
policy changes (Tomlin 1997). The second idea was for Canada to host an international 
meeting of officials and NGOs to develop an action plan to work on landmines. This 
second route, which became known as the Ottawa Process, was chosen. (English 1998). 
3.6 The Ottawa Process 
The Ottawa Process was the series of events that lead to the signing of the Ottawa 
Treaty. It had three key features : first, civil society and government formed a partnership 
to pursue a common policy objective; second, small and middle powers played leading 
roles; and third, it unfolded with unprecedented speed (Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade Canada 2000). In fact, the Ottawa Process was started in late 1996 and completed 
with the signing of the Ottawa Treaty at the Ottawa conference in December of 1997. The 
following events lead to the start of the Ottawa Process. 
The UN' s CCW's was unable to move the land mme 1ssue forward. CCW 
produced the Amended Protocol II, which was the product of the lowest common 
denominator approach, itself the product of consensus, which proved that the officials 
were deadlocked (Short 1997). The ICRC declared that the restrictions in the amended 
protocol were inadequate and difficult to put into practice. The ICBL said only a total ban 
would have the simplicity to be effective. (English 1998; Williams 2000) 
On the evening of April 22, 1996, members of the ICBL met at the home of 
Quaker activist David Atwood in Geneva, Switzerland (Dolan and Hunt 1998; English 
1998; Grisdale 1999). Members of NGOs as well as representatives of twelve states 
including Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Norway, New Zealand, Mexico, Ireland 
and Peru were at this meeting (Grisdale 1999). Canada's delegate was Bob Lawson 
40 
(Grisdale 1999). Alternative courses of action were discussed, one being to hold another 
international conference (English 1998; Grisdale 1999). The idea to hold a conference 
was in line with what IDA had recommended, and after further discussion it had by April 
grown to include a Canadian-sponsored UN resolution on landmines. Sinclair told 
Grisdale that "At least we [could] offer to host a meeting where those countries can sit 
down with NGOs and the ICRC and muse about the possibilities of an eventual ban and 
how to get from here to there" (Grisdale 1999). The Ottawa Process, the series of events 
that lead to the signing of the Ottawa Treaty, was thus started. 
The proposed meeting was named the "International Land Mine Strategy Session" 
and was instrumental at converting the January moratorium into a complete ban on the 
production, transfer, and use of APMs (Tomlin 1998, 13). IDA officer, Bob Lawson, who 
had earlier helped facilitate landmines jumping from DND to DFAIT, was given the go-
ahead by Jill Sinclair, then the director of IDA, to announce that Canada would host the 
October meeting in Ottawa (Tomlin 1998, 12; Wareham 1998, 226). Moreover, in 
response to the Amended Protocol being adopted on May 03, 1996, Canadian 
Ambassador Mark Moher announced that Canada would hold a strategy conference of 
states that would support a total ban in Ottawa later that year (Dolan and Hunt 1998; 
English 1998). 
The ICBL and the Canadian government were wary that there would be officials 
in attendance that could potentially hamper the policy process. As a result, all states 
would be invited, but a process of self-selection was designed by the organizers to 
prevent opponents from sabotaging the agreement. A Final Declaration was circulated 
prior to the conference: "Those who could sign on were invited as participants; those who 
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would not came as observers" (English 1998, 18). Tomlin (1998) argues that the self-
selection process worked "like magic," and thus the self-selection device was critically 
important for the success of the Ottawa Process (English 1998, 18). 
The ICBL and Canada encouraged US endorsement of the conference and of the 
new APM policy. Although President Bill Clinton was initially supportive of a ban on 
landmines, the US wanted significant changes to the proposed policy. Rather than support 
an outright ban on APMs, the US wanted to remove language referring to "zero by 2000" 
which meant that there were to be no new mine deployments by the year 2000 (Wareham 
1998, 36). Nevertheless, Thomas McNamara, the United States ' delegate, attended the 
sessions as a full participant (Wareham 1998). 
Tomlin (1998) argues that the US was concerned about Canada's intention to 
work with NGOs at the Ottawa conference (13). Axworthy saw a unique relationship 
developing between the Government and NGOs with the landmines issue: "He noted the 
prominent role played by NGOs on the issue and ... indicated his interest in a partnership 
which would link NGO efforts with Canada's ability to champion the issue 
internationally" (Tomlin 1998, 11 ). Ultimately, when Axworthy announced his intention 
for Canada to hold a Ottawa Treaty-signing conference, most delegates "were shocked 
and amazed," but the US delegates, many who had left the morning of the declaration, 
were angry (Wareham 1998, 227). The Americans issued a statement that expressed their 
displeasure with Axworthy' s surprise statement, and Wareham (1998) argues that there 
was every indication that the U.S. would pursue its landmines agenda in the Conference 
on Disarmament rather than participate in the Ottawa Treaty (227). 
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IDA officials and ICBL representatives worked together on drafting the invitation 
list to the Ottawa conference. The ICBL was extremely useful because they linked 
DF AIT with the existing anti-mine movement. A group of core partners consisting of 
ban-friendly states worked closely with the ICRC and the ICBL to rally support for the 
ban, and this also facilitated participation in the policy process that took place between 
Ottawa 1996 to Ottawa 1997 (English 1998). However, when the US announced that they 
intended to pursue the landmine ban in the Conference of Disarmament (CD) or in an 
arena that would only allow a policy change based on consensus, it initially appeared that 
there would only be a number of smaller states willing to sign the treaty. None of the 
permanent members of the Security Council supported the Ottawa Process; Australia ' s 
position was similar to that of the US, and most European nations were opting out. 
In an effort to drum up support, the ICRC undertook facilitating a series of 
regional conferences "which brought together ICBL representatives, representatives of 
governments and military experts to talk about what to do about landmines" (Dolan and 
Hunt 1998; English 2000: the source of the direct quotation). The ICBL maintained its 
pressure on governments to commit to ban on landmines. Having commissioned another 
study on the military utility of APMs, the ICRC declared that "landmines had little 
military utility and that the humanitarian consequences of the use of landmines far 
outweighed that utility," and the findings were supported by the authoritative voices of 
several military officials (English 2000, 31 ). Political shifts in Britain (to the Labour 
Party) and in France (with a Socialist government) resulted in dramatic shifts in their 
APM policy, and this meant that the Security Council was no longer united in opposition 
(Desch et al. 1998; English 1998). Lady Diana, Princess of Wales had also been on the 
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front pages of newspapers and in television clips for her trips to Angola and Bosnia, and 
her tragic death at the end of the summer of 1996 was a "powerful force" in the 
promoting of a ban in policy circles (English 1998; Herby and Maslen 1998; Rutherford 
and White 1998). The Ottawa strategy sessions that took place on October 3, 1996 were 
attended by 50 governments and 24 observer governments, all of whom had pledged to 
support the ban. The ICBL, the ICRC, various UN agencies, and many NGO 
representatives were also in attendance (Tomlin 1998). 
3. 7 Problems Encountered and Overcome During the Ottawa Process 
The Ottawa Process encountered a series of state-level problems as many states 
still felt that an outright ban was foolhardy (Tomlin 1998). A number of mine-producing 
countries, including the US, China, Iran and North and South Korea were opposed or not 
willing to agree to ban. As well, Canada was accused of "grandstanding," and some 
critiques felt there was a chance that the treaty could fail (Tomlin 1998, 20). Patrick 
Leahy (1997) stated that United States ' President Bill Clinton said he could not sign the 
treaty although new deadlines would be set for ending US use of anti-personnel mines 
except those that are mixed with anti-tank mines. The US's decision to opt out of the 
treaty was an especially bitter pill for the treaty organizers. 
The US ' s unwillingness to commit to a ban did not seem to hurt the policy 
process. In a surprise announcement, Russian President Boris Y eltsin announced his 
intention for Russia to sign the Convention although at some later date (Short 1997). 
Some unexpected states, like Australia and Japan, announced that they would attend the 
conference in Ottawa with an intention to sign the Ottawa Treaty. In fact, 74 states, rather 
than the expected 15 attended (Cameron 1998, 43 7) . Latin America and Africa were 
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already strong-supporters of the proposed plan, and they agreed that the regions should be 
united in the goal to ban APMs. Core partners offered support for states that wanted to 
attend the conference but had financial constraints. By the end of November 1997, there 
were over 100 states intending to sign the treaty, and there were thousands of NGO 
representatives and journalists planning to attend (English 2000). 
3.8 The Ottawa Treaty 
The Ottawa Treaty came to fruition in early December 1997 when representatives 
from 122 states came to Ottawa to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. 
In Canada, the House of Commons, which is usually noted for its bitter divisions over 
foreign policy decisions, ratified the landmines treaty without a dissenting vote (English 
2000). At its conclusion, the Ottawa Treaty was celebrated as a success for the Canadian 
government (as well as for many other signatories) and for the ICBL. The Canadian 
government achieved a leadership role in the making of an international treaty that 
represented an important humanitarian issue. The ICBL and its member NGOs were 
given a partnership role in the making of the Ottawa Treaty. Although there were 
important countries like the US that did not sign the Ottawa Treaty, both the Canadian 
government and the ICBL NGOs achieved their desired policy outcome. 
3.9 ICBL Summary 
An international ban on APMs represented a shift towards a new way of framing 
security ideology. The Ottawa Treaty went beyond traditional arms control as it obliged 
states to destroy their stores of APMs, and it asked states to participate in the care, 
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rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration of mine victims (Beier and Crosby 
1998). The Convention was rooted in humanitarian law but also contained elements of 
disarmament law (Desch et a!. 1998). Furthermore, the Ottawa Treaty is the result of 
concerted cooperative efforts of NGOs worldwide, which resulted in the ICBL rallying 
public opinion and building successful working relationships with policy makers (English 
1998; Cameron 1998, Axworthy 1998). Public opinion polls that were carried out in 
several nations in 1996 revealed that, "support for a total ban was present in every 
country with most populations offering over 75 percent support" (English 1998, 131). 
The success of the Ottawa Treaty was in large part due to the effectiveness of the ICBL. 
The ICBL was effective in achieving its desired outcome for a number of reasons. 
First, it was effective at getting the landmines issue onto the international foreign policy 
agenda. Second, it was successful in generating broad-based grassroots support, which 
contributed to public pressure onto state-level governments. Third, the ICBL experienced 
a fruitful relationship with the Canadian government, which ultimately led to the Ottawa 
Process and eventually the Ottawa Treaty. The ICBL was especially effective in 
influencing Canadian foreign policy on landmines due to its success in partnering with 
officials in DF AlT. 
Some of the MBT's key actors included the Canadian and US governments, the 
International Committee to Ban Landmines and its Steering Committee members, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Jody Williams, Andre Ouellet, Lloyd 
Axworthy, Bill Clinton, Princess Diana, and Cornelio Sommaruga. In fact, the landmine 
awareness campaigns, the formation and work of the ICBL, the creation of a policy 
agenda for landmines, the Ottawa Process, and the Ottawa Treaty are examples of NGOs 
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cooperating with each other and with government officials in order to facilitate an 
international policy change. The campaign to ban landmines holds lessons on how NGO 
campaigns can be effective in reaching desired policy objectives. 
4.0 Analyzing the Campaign to Ban Landmines Against Chapman and Fisher's 
Taxonomy 
In the following chart, the NGO campaign to ban landmines is analyzed against 
Chapman and Fisher's taxonomy. The story of the NGO campaign to ban landmines is 
data-mined for evidence that supports Chapman and Fisher' s variables of NGO 
effectiveness. The reader may wish to refer to the template on pages 20-23 . 
Table 3.1 Comparing the Campaign to Ban Landmines to Chapman and Fisher's 
Taxonomy 
Variables 
l.Timeline 
2.Concurrent 
work 
How does the variable contribute to the International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines' effectiveness in achieving a policy change? 
• Campaigning over two decades led to the formation of the 
ICBL, the Ottawa Process, and in 1997 the signing of the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
their Destruction (Mine Ban Treaty, MBT). 
• 
• 
• 
The ICBL's story was and is not linear; its beginning IS 
somewhat unclear and it has not yet disbanded. 
The ICBL worked simultaneously at different stages 
(timeline), different levels (e.g. international and national), 
and in different locations. 
There was a cumulative effect of campaigning over time . 
• The ICBL was conducted at many different levels (grassroots, 
national, international) and, within these, in different arenas 
(UN, national governments, international conventions) . 
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3. Collaboration 
4.Legitimacy 
5 .Individuals 
and mobilizing 
people 
• The Canadian foreign policy arena facilitated the policy 
process. 
• Concurrent work helped bring about the MBT, and continues 
to help monitor and implement the Treaty. 
o Example 1: The ICBL works with de-mining groups 
to facilitate the removal of existing mines. 
o Example 2: The ICBL has targeted non-state armed 
groups to broaden the campaign. 
• Note: these examples are explained in Chapter 5 
• A mix of " insider" and "outsider" strategies were employed. 
• 
o Insider = NGO-CFP working relationship cited in the 
literature 
o Outsider = ICBL lobbied governments and 
governmental departments 
Organizational structure = pyramid + wheel 
o The coordinating secretariat sends information 
vertically, but various levels of the ICBL coordinate 
independently 
• As more players became involved, cooperation became more 
complex (de-mining groups saw funds better spent on de-
mining activities; national governments competed to facilitate 
the MBT), but collaboration between NGOs and between 
NGOs and states helped move the campaign forward. 
• ICBL brought legitimacy with its international expenence 
and its expertise on the landmine issue. 
o Resulted m the ICBL entering into a working 
relationship with the Canadian government. 
o Resulted in a broad movement supported in principal 
by civil society. 
Specific individuals who had a flair for motivating people and 
who had a combined social conscience and strategic vision 
contributed to the landmines ban agenda moving forward. 
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6.Narrow focus 
?.Role of 
government 
and judiciary 
8.International 
context 
At the national level, individuals like Andre Ouellet, Lloyd 
Axworthy, Jean Chretien and many Ngo leaders like Jody 
Williams helped set the internationallandmines agenda. 
Other individuals like Cornelio Sommaruga, Boutras Boutras 
Ghali, Pope Jean Paul, the Dalai Lama, and Princess Diana 
helped to mobilize people around the campaign issue. 
o The ICBL mobilized people around the world in 
support of the landmines ban. Individuals and 
grassroots NGOs were given active roles. 
o Grassroots play an active role in the implementation 
and monitoring of the MBT. 
• Narrow focus = international ban on the use, stockpiling, 
production and transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines 
• Campaign has broadened to tackle other weapons (ex. cluster 
munitions). 
• Note: This will be discussed in Chapter 5 
• Governments = Canada facilitated the Ottawa Process; ICBL 
cooperated with the Canadian government which actively 
pursued a policy change. 
• National law = 122 countries initially signed the MBT 
• International conventions = human rights codes; MBT 
• The international context of the ICBL influenced its 
effectiveness: collaboration between NGOs from different 
counties, international conventions, and coverage of an issue 
in the international media. 
o The ICBL collaborated with Northern and Southern 
NGOs. 
o The ICBL benefited greatly from the work done by 
the ICRC. 
o The ICBL employed an international mines awareness 
campaign. 
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9 .Implementati 
on and 
monitoring 
lO.Tools 
11. Work at the 
grassroots 
• The ICBL continues to monitor the MBT at the international, 
national, and grassroots levels. 
• The ICBL actively works to expand, improve, and broaden 
the MBT. 
• Codes of conduct = the MBT established an international 
code of conduct for APMs. APMs were labelled as inhumane 
and illegal; countries that do not abide by the MBT are 
publicized. 
• Labelling= Does not apply. 
• Social auditing = Mine awareness programs run at the 
grassroots level through the ICBL, the ICRC, and other 
affiliated NGOs. 
• Disagreements occurred at various stages of the campaign 
most significantly in the CCW Review Conference and in 
context to the United State's decision to not sign the Ottawa 
Treaty. 
• Grassroots involvement IS essential to ensunng real and 
sustained change. 
o Grassroots IS responsible for the monitoring of the 
MBT. 
• A direct link is shown between the MBT and project work in 
local communities. 
• Campaigning and advocacy work is very valuable, but its 
effect is limited unless governments enforce the MBT. 
In summary, all eleven of Chapman and Fisher' s variables for NGO effectiveness 
are evident in the story of how the ICBL achieved a policy change. It is interesting that 
the ICBL had a positive working relationship with some governments, yet its campaign 
needed a combination of variables to reach its objective of a policy change. For example, 
the ICBL was effective in developing a working relationship with Canadian foreign 
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policymakers, which helped to facilitate the process that led to the MBT. Nevertheless, 
the ICBL had to be effective in lobbying a multitude of other state policymakers to make 
the Ottawa Process useful. In other words, being effective in lobbying one country can 
help to move a campaign along its timeline, but an effective NGO campaign must be 
effective in the international arena in order to facilitate a policy change. Ultimately, the 
taxonomy's variables prove to be consistent with the variables that contributed to the 
ICBL' s effectiveness. These results will be compared to the results of the analysis of the 
campaign to stop the MAl in Chapter 5. 
In the next section, the story of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl) 
and the NGO campaign to stop it is told and then compared to Chapman and Fisher's 
taxonomy for NGO effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT (MAl) 
4.1 Introduction to the International NGO Campaign to Block the MAl 
On December 3, 1998, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) announced that talks on the MAl had been halted permanently. A 
combination of factors, one of which was the international NGO campaign, contributed to 
the failure of the MAl negotiations. As a consequence, the international NGO campaign 
against the MAl is cited as an example of how NGO campaigns can be effective in 
achieving an international policy change (Kobrin 1998; Sjolander and de Larrinaga 2000; 
Smythe 2001 ; Laxer 2003). 
In this chapter, it will be shown how and why the international NGO campaign 
against the MAl was effective at achieving an international policy change in respect to its 
contribution to the failure of the MAl negotiations. In addition, other issues will be 
shown to have contributed to the failure ofMAI negotiations: the OECD, the inability for 
the negotiators to come to a consensus, and the decision to keep the negotiations private. 
This chapter will also show that the international campaign against the MAl was effective 
in influencing Canadian foreign policy on the MAL The NGO campaign's effect on 
Canadian negotiators is woven into the chronology of the MAl negotiations. It will be 
shown that the use of e-mail, the World Wide Web, information sharing techniques, 
public awareness campaigns, and direct lobby efforts contributed to state-level 
governments - like that of Canada - choosing to end the MAl negotiations. 
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4.2 Origins 
The MAl was intended to act as an international policy for economic 
globalization and increased international investment opportunities, "a binding agreement 
within a like-minded group of wealthier economies" (Smythe 2001 , 154). American 
business elites led policy discussions on the idea for an international investment deal 
from the early 1980s into the late 1990s (Wood 2000, 34). The international business 
community (which was dominated by North American and European interests) had been 
working with state-level policy makers in the US and Europe in a series of General 
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade rounds since the end of World War II (Walter 2001). It 
recognized that the international economy had become truly globalized, and liberal 
economic principles were being further institutionalized (Mingst and Warkentin 2000). A 
fear that the politicization of international commercial negotiations would threaten 
international economic liberalization resulted in the start of first negotiations for an 
international investment agreement. 
The first international investment policy discussions began in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (later the WTO) Uruguay Round negotiations 
in the mid-1980s. However, most major OECD countries and business lobbyists were 
unhappy with Uruguay Round negotiations in the areas of trade-related investment 
measures (TRIMs) and trade in services (GATS, General Agreement on Trade and 
Services)' (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 1995). The broad, 
overlapping business coalition, specifically the US Council for International Business 
53 
(USCIB)2, had a significant influence over the US investment rules strategy, and this was 
one factor behind the US preference for negotiation of the MAl within the OECD (Walter 
2001). As a result of support from the US government, a broad business coalition led by 
the USCIB moved the international investment policy meetings to the OECD. As a 
consequence, OECD country delegates were joined by the international business 
community, and negotiations commenced. 
The intention of the USCIB, and in turn the US government, was to negotiate a 
broad, enforceable multilateral agreement on investment that would be free standing and 
open to accession once completed (Mingst & Warkentin 2000, 241). In the initial OECD 
negotiations, three basic principles were drafted: (1) non-discriminatory treatment for 
investments, with limited and specified exceptions; (2) high standard investor protection, 
including clear limits to expropriation, a right to due legal process and compensation in 
such an event, and the right of investors to impartial international arbitration in the event 
of a dispute with a host government; and (3) full operating freedom for investors, 
including the right to all investment-related financial transfers, prohibitions from the 
imposition of performance requirements, and the right to transfer managerial personnel 
(Walter 2001, 60). National treatment and most-favoured-nation (MFN) obligations were 
at the core of the transnational corporations' (TN C) principles (Kobrin 1998). 
International business groups from other major OECD countries agreed in general 
with the principles of the US-corporate agenda, but there was opposition. The different 
attitudes of business lobbies were "reflected in the corresponding government positions 
in the preliminary negotiations that followed" (Walter 2001 , 60). For example, the 
2 The USCIB is the US affiliate of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and represents the US 
corporate sector in the Business and Industry Advisory Council (BJAC) at the OECD. 
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European business lobby was hesitant about negotiating the MAl in the OECD as it 
preferred the WTO, and Japan's Keidanran business organization was concerned that 
outlawing policy practices would not encourage developing countries to adhere to the 
MAl (Walter 2001, 60). At the state-level, Sir Leon Brittan, the European Trade 
Commissioner, believed that the WTO would be a better venue for engaging developing 
countries (Walter 2001). The Japanese government also did not support the US position 
on the grounds that it preferred the WTO, which they felt would be more inclusive, over 
the OECD (Walter 2001). 
The US negotiating team (government and TNC representatives), however, were 
firm in the belief that the OECD forum was a narrower, more sympathetic, and 
appropriate venue than the WTO (Walter 2001). OECD members represented 85 percent 
of all foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows and 447 of the Global Fortune 500 
corporations (Walter 2001). Overall, it was felt a better agreement could be negotiated in 
OECD's corporate-friendly forum (Clarke and Barlow 1997, 27; Kobrin 1998, 100). US 
negotiators insisted that the principles outlined above be followed. They argued that the 
principles already existed in the US Model Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement's (NAFTA) Chapter 11; thus watering down the 
principles was unacceptable (Walter 2001, 61). Ultimately, the US won the argument 
over the international forum in which to house the negotiations and thus the OECD 
became the chosen venue. 
In May 1995, the OECD Committee on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises (CIME) and the OECD Committee on Capital Movements and 
Invisible Transactions (CMIT) presented their case for a multilateral agreement on 
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investment to the OECD Council meeting at Ministerial level (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 2007). They stated that they were convinced 
that the time was right and that the foundations had been laid for the successful 
negotiation of an investment agreement that could build on "the OECD's existing 
instruments and expertise" (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
2007). In addition, dramatic growth and change in foreign direct investment (FDI) was 
being hampered by investment barriers, discriminatory treatment and uncertainties 
(Roberts 1998, 24). OECD governments and members of the international business 
community wanted a framework that would better deal with investment opportunities and 
challenges (Roberts 1998, 24). Moreover, CIME and CMIT argued further that the new 
investment framework was important for setting "high standards and a balanced and 
equitable framework for dealing with investment issues" which could in tum strengthen 
the existing multilateral trading regime (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 2007). Consequently, the OECD members expressed concerns that 
remaining investment restrictions were a barrier to free market access. 
In response to the mandate of the June 1995 OECD meeting, the policy process 
for the MAl was started: "the meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial level now 
adopt the mandate for negotiating a multilateral agreement on investment " (Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 2007). It was agreed that one of the key 
intents of the MAl was to "establish a level of investment liberalization" that could attract 
larger developing countries in Latin America and Asia (Smythe 2001, 154). Conversely, 
the mandate for negotiating the MAl also included the recognition that there were areas 
of disagreement that needed to be addressed, but the objective was to conclude the 
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agreement by the time of the Ministerial meeting in 1997 (Mingst and Warkentin 2000, 
241). Having learned from the fierce debates swirling around NAFTA and WTO, OECD 
decided to not publically announce the start of the MAl talks. When the MAl talks began 
in 1995 in the OECD in Paris, France, the OECD countries were keen to see their 
economies expand, and were even keener to see to it that they had a certain level of 
control over how the investment deal would be created and employed. 
4.3 The MAl Negotiations 
MAl delegates were primarily representatives of Trade Ministries and 
transnational corporations. Sergio Marchi, the Canadian Minister of Trade, led Team 
Canada's contingent at the MAl talks in Paris. The US administration sent a delegation 
consisting of members of the US Council for International Business (USCIB), Office of 
the US Trade Representative, and the US Department of the State. The other OECD 
member states sent delegations consisting of candidates in similar governmental 
leadership roles. In addition, some elite corporate leaders - from the USCIB, for example 
- were included in the early stages of the MAl negotiations (Walter 2001 , 61 ; 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2000). In addition to the 
USCIB, members from the Business and Industry Advisory Council's (BIAC) MAl 
experts group used its influence in the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) to 
coordinate an international corporate lobby. TNCs continued to enjoy a privileged 
relationship with the OECD membership. The narrow MAl negotiating team -the OECD 
member state negotiators and the TNC representatives - agreed to have the MAl fast-
tracked and ready to sign in 1997, two years after the first meeting. 
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4.3.1 Initial Planning 
The MAl negotiations initially went well (Mingst and Warkentin 2000, 242). The 
1995 Paris negotiations were attended by all 293 members of OECD plus the European 
Commission and later a few non-OECD states joined the negotiations. 
On the outset, negotiators also agreed that once a firm deal had been signed, it 
was to be taken to the WTO where an accession clause similar to NAFTA's would 
promote the signing of non-OECD states. Countries would be allowed to join the 
agreement on a negotiated, case-by-case basis (Smythe 2001 , 154). It was also agreed 
that the deal would punish investment regulations and protect foreign investment 
(Smythe 2001 , 154). Finally, as negotiations on the broad principles of trade 
liberalization gave way to more specific provisions, the MAl talks slowed, but still 
produced a rough consensus by January 1997 (Mingst and Warkentin 2000, 243). 
4. 3. 2 Process 
The 1997 agreement included the three main policy areas (as noted in section 4.2) 
that the US business lobby had drafted two years prior: investment protection, investment 
liberalization, and binding dispute resolution (Bray 1998; Martin and Varney 2000). The 
underlying principle of investment was to be non-discrimination: "government 
signatories were to commit themselves to treatment of foreign investors and their 
investments no less favourably than they treat their own investors" (Drohan 1998). As 
well, signatories were to adhere to the policy's terms for a minimum of five years, and 
"even if a country decided to withdraw, foreign investors who had entered the country 
3 There are now 30 OECD members. 
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while the MAl was in force would continue to enjoy its privileges for a minimum of 15 
years" (Bray 1998). 
However, even though a draft agreement had been tabled, the OECD member 
negotiating group had become discontent with the process, especially "with the role of 
the OECD secretariat and the chair of the negotiating group in putting forward draft texts 
that were not considered by some members to represent a consensus" (Smythe 2001, 
154). No government, for instance, was willing to undermine its autonomy on taxation 
matters. As well, the French and Canadian governments demanded that their cultural 
industries be left out of the agreement; this was unacceptable to the US corporate 
negotiators (Walter 2001). In addition to the problems that had begun between corporate 
and governmental negotiators, political divisions emerged in March and April as member 
states lodged their reservations to the obligations of the draft text (Smythe 200 I). 
At the same time as internal problems that were hampering the MAl draft 
negotiations, NGOs began a general campaign against the negotiation of a multilateral 
agreement in investment. In late January 1997, a 170 page (90 percent complete) draft 
text of the MAl was leaked to Public Citizen, a US-based public interest group founded 
by Ralph Nader (Mingst and Warkentin 2000, 240; Wood 2000, 32). Within hours, the 
draft was spread throughout the NGO community and, in turn, throughout the world 
(Public Citizen 1999). As a result, the issues that had being causing problems within the 
private OECD negotiations became matters for public discourse. 
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4.4 The International NGO Campaign Against the MAl 
Upon release of the MAl draft text, NGOs expressed a number of concerns. First, 
NGOs pointed attention to the draft text as proof of a secretive process that threatened 
democracy, sovereignty, and citizen's rights because the MAl would have been binding 
and would have been undertaken with no public consultation (Barlow and Clarke 1997; 
Martin and Varney 2000; Smythe 2001). In addition, NGOs were opposed to the MAl's 
broad definition of investors, investment, and the benefits of investment, essentially the 
MAl's key policies designed to remove barriers to international investment. Others 
pointed out that the MAl threatened democracy because it was to include all levels of 
government and it had no reservations for culture or the environment. Finally, NGOs 
were opposed to potential rollbacks on environmental or labour laws, and it seemed 
outrageous that countries would have to give five year' s notice to opt out of the MAl plus 
another 15 ofhaving to abide by its rules (Dobbin 1998). 
Environmental and Canadian NGOs were the first to mobilize against the MAL 
Environmental NGOs were alarmed by the MAl's broad anti-expropriation clause similar 
and proposal to link it to investor-state dispute settlement (Canada and the World 
Backgrounder 1998). Canadian NGOs, such as the Polaris Institute and the Council of 
Canadians, were already concerned with NAFTA' s Chapter 11 , especially the clause on 
investor-state dispute settlement. The MAl was seen to further increase the rights of 
corporations at the cost of workers, the environment, and communities (Durban 1997). 
NGOs argued that NAFf A, and consequently the MAl, undermined democratic rights and 
sovereignty (Sforza and Valliantos 1997; Walter 2001). 
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NGOs from around the world joined the anti-MAl campaign: a sampling include 
AFL-CIO [US Federation of Labour Organizations], Amnesty International, Australian 
Conservation Foundation, Friends of the Earth, World Wildlife Fund for Nature, Oxfam, 
Third World Network, World Development Movement, United Steelworkers of America, 
Western Governors' Association, World Development Movement, as well as NGOs from 
throughout Europe (Kobrin 1998, 98; Walter, 2001). More than 600 NGOs in more than 
70 countries mobilized against the MAl (Kobrin 1998). However, unlike the ICBL. the 
anti-MAl campaign had no central secretariat; information was shared through a complex 
web of emails and telecommunications. NGOs or NGO coalitions could participate in the 
campaign using whatever strategy they decided was most effective. 
In addition, the anti-MAl campaign is noted for NGO leaders like Maude Barlow, 
the chairperson of the Council of Canadians, and Tony Clarke who initiated fact-finding 
missions and worked tirelessly to educate the public about the MAL In 1997, Barlow and 
Clarke published MAl: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Threat to 
Canadian Sovereignty, which was a key resource for the anti-MAl campaign. Terry 
Cottam, a grassroots organizer, started the MAl-Not! website, Murray Dobbin of the 
Council of Canadians and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives spoke at dozens of 
rallies and published numerous articles, and hundreds of other important individuals 
participated in the campaign in various ways. Finally, the campaign against the MAl also 
included unions, environmental groups, green parties, some small political parties, church 
groups, as well as consumer and aid organizations (Martin and Varney 2000). In other 
words, the campaign against the MAl was dynamic, broad-based, and energized. The 
kinds of strategies adopted by campaigners are addressed in the next section. 
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4.5 Campaign Strategies 
NGOs used multiple strategies- World Wide Web, email, media (newspapers, 
TV, and video), and public demonstrations - to target state-level governments and 
grassroots in the NGO campaign against the MAL 
4.5.1 World Wide Web 
The NGO campaign found the World Wide Web to be especially useful. First, the 
World Wide Web was a low-cost communications medium used to coordinate NGO 
activities and to provide information (Barlow and Clarke 1998; Walter 2001). Getting 
information about the MAl onto the World Wide Web suited the non-linear NGO 
campaign structure. Information could be popularly accessed at any time. The spread of 
information over the World Wide Web countered secrecy and promoted transparency 
(Bray 1998). Canadian NGOs, in particular, worked hard to post and update anti-MAl 
websites (Martin and Varney 2000). In early 1998, the Council of Canadians used the 
internet to publish a joint statement against the MAl which was endorsed by 560 
organizations in 67 countries (Bray 1998). The World Wide Web also allowed NGOs to 
discuss and post alternatives to the MAL The Polaris Institute, for example, posted ideas 
on how a multilateral agreement on investment should look on its website. Ultimately, 
the World Wide Web was useful because it facilitated information between NGOs and 
government officials, NGOs and grassroots, and grassroots and government officials. 
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4.5.2 Email 
NGOs used email to facilitate information about the MAl between individuals. 
Emailing between activists was affordable and efficient and it helped to quickly build 
momentum for the NGO campaign (Barlow and Clarke 1998). Furthermore, NGOs 
targeted state-level policy makers through email and phone calls. For example, Terry 
Cottam, a concerned citizen from Ottawa, used the MAl-Not! website to initiate an email 
campaign (Nelson 1998). It was widely assumed that most Canadian Members of 
Parliament (MPs) had not even read the MAl (Nelson 1998), so Sergio Marchi and other 
MPs were mass emailed a request to explain and justify who the MAl would benefit and 
harm. Every MP was also sent an "MP Accountability Toolkit" (MAl-Not! website). 
In addition to email, NGOs used phone call and letter writing campaigns. 
Australian NGOs organized a petition against the MAl plus organized a mass letter 
writing campaign to Members of Parliament (Khor 1998b ). Similarly, US NGOs 
organised "national call-in days" with phone calls from members of the public to 
Senators and members of the MAl negotiating team urging them to reject the MAl (Khor 
1998). The Preamble Collaborative, a small Washington-based NGO, also focussed on 
letter writing to promote rigorous public debate about the MAl (Kobrin 1998). 
4.5.3 Media 
The NGO campaign used the media to spread information about the MAL NGOs 
targeted advertisement opportunities, letters to the editor columns, magazines, and 
television. For instance, in 1997 Gust before the May election), Canadian NGOs took out 
a full-scale advertisement in the Toronto Globe and Mail to raise grassroots awareness 
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about the MAL To encourage the public to voice its dissent, the NGO campaign provided 
online lists of the names and addresses for most of North America's newspapers and 
magazines (Barlow and Clarke 1998; MAl-Not! 1998). Thousands of people wrote 
letters. For example, the Economics Editor of the London Guardian wrote a one-page 
critical analysis of the MAl in response to the United Kingdom's (UK) Minister of Trade 
and Industry, Lord Clinton-Davis' article in support of the MAl (Khor 1998). In another 
instance, Canadian politician David Orchard wrote a series of anti-MAl articles that were 
published online in the Thunder Bay Chronicle Journal (Orchard 1997). Jim Porter, an 
associate professor at the University of Windsor, wrote to the MAl-Not! coalition 
through the letters to the editor section of the Windsor Star. He reported that although the 
CBC media coverage of the MAl was limited that month to coverage of Maude Barlow 
(events featuring Tony Clarke and Paul Heyer were not picked up by the CBC), he was 
granted a weekly guest column in the Windsor Star where he would report on the various 
problem areas of the MAl (Porter 1998). 
In addition to print media, NGO leaders were featured on television and in videos. 
For example, Working TV, a labour television program broadcast in British Columbia, 
Canada, facilitated two one hour specials from the January 29, 1998 Public Forum on the 
MAl featuring Maude Barlow (Working TV 2007). The videos, in addition to being 
broadcasted, were made available over the World Wide Web. In New Zealand, the MAl 
protest was discussed and debated daily on radio and television (Nelson 1998). 
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4. 5. 4 Public Demonstrations 
Public demonstrations created focal points for anti-MAl activities. For example, on 
February 17, 1998, NGOs in Finland turned Helinski ' s downtown into a street theatre 
where scenes of the MAl stealing economic independence were acted out (Khor 1998). In 
Sweden, NGO activists lobbied outside the head office of Ericsson, the Swedish 
telecommunications TNC, "pointing out the contradiction between what the company 
says it wants in its environmental report and the position of the International Chamber of 
Commerce of which it is a member" (Khor 1998b ). Furthermore, in April 1998, 
Vancouver, Canada-based Defence of Canadian Liberty Committee (DCLC) took the 
Canadian government to court in a suit that claimed that the MAl was fundamentally 
unconstitutional under Canadian law. Hundreds of people rallied outside of the 
courthouse. These are a sampling of the hundreds of international NGO campaign 
activities that were staged around the world. 
Ultimately, the anti-MAl NGO campatgn was successful in engagmg both 
governments and the general public. In the following section, it will be shown how NGO 
strategies contributed to problems arising in the MAl negotiations. 
4.6 MAl Negotiations Continued 
The NGO campaign in Canada and internationally was initially met with limited 
success in its attempts to influence the MAl policy agenda. In Canada, after the NGO 
campaign had raised awareness of the MAl, the House of Commons Standing Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and International Trade "thoroughly assessed the MAl draft and 
Canada's role in it, and it was critical of expropriation provisions and their implications" 
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(Smythe 2001, 156). Nevertheless, the committee ultimately endorsed Canada's role in 
the MAl negotiations (Smythe 2001). 
At the international level, NGOs had limited success in affecting the MAl 
negotiations. On October 27, 1997, the international NGO campaign against the MAl had 
a "fractious" meeting with the OECD negotiating group where they requested that the 
MAl negotiations be suspended until an "independent and comprehensive assessment of 
the social, environmental, and development impact of the MAl with full public 
participation" could be carried out (Taylor 1997; Barlow and Clark 1998; Smythe 2001). 
The NGO campaign also called for a removal of the MAl's investor-state dispute 
resolution and expropriation provision, an enforceable agreement on investor 
responsibility, increased transparency in the MAl negotiations, an increase in the breadth 
of government departments involved with negotiations, and a renegotiation of the terms 
of withdrawal (Taylor 1997). The OECD negotiating group simply denied the NGO 
campaign's demands (Smythe 2001). 
In part due to NGO campaign pressure, the partnership between the TNCs and 
OECD governments continued to breakdown. US business lobbies opposed amending the 
MAl to exclude environmental or labour objectives on the grounds that it would 
jeopardize business support for the MAl and would deter non-OECD members from 
joining (Walter 2001; Smythe 2001). Most OECD government negotiators felt there was 
little choice but to include binding language on not lowering environmental and labour 
standards. Canada and Japan, as well as all of Europe (after the United Kingdom's May 
1997 election) for example, were not willing to sign the MAl unless flexible language on 
the environment and labour was included. By February 1998, the US government 
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conceded that normal regulatory actions should not, even when they affected the value of 
investments, be subject to compensation, a key principle of the MAl (Mingst and 
Warkentin 2000; Walter 2001). BIAC complained that the MAl draft had lost sight of its 
original intentions and threatened a business defection in the ratification process (Walter 
2001). 
After attempting to save the negotiations with a high level political meeting in 
February 1998, it became clear to the OECD governments that if an agreement could be 
made, it would not likely be worth the political costs (Smythe 2001 ). France and a few 
other states under domestic political pressure advocated for a hiatus, which was agreed to 
in April 1998. The CBC reported that although the Secretary General of the OECD, 
Donald Johnston, put the best face on the delay, at least one negotiator said the break 
"amounted to a quiet burial for the deal" (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 1998). 
Negotiations were to be resumed in mid-October. 
NGO campaigners continued to advocate against the MAl at the domestic level. 
Many provincial/state and municipal governments in Canada and the US felt that the 
MAl would undermine their own political authority. As a result, many cities declared 
themselves "MAl Free Zones" (Walter 2001). Despite the OECD's efforts to save the 
MAl, many Canadian and American cities, provinces, and states wrote their own 
legislation against the MAL For example, on April 28, 1998, the City of Vancouver, 
British Columbia passed a motion: 
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT the City of Vancouver urge the 
Government of Canada to consult widely and in depth with the people of 
Canada, especially and including, the soliciting of detailed responses from 
municipal councils, before taking any further action on the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (Public Citizen, 1998). 
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Likewise, on April 20, 1998 San Francisco city council passed legislation: 
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Board of Supervisors of the 
City and County of San Francisco hereby urges its state and federally 
elected officials and lobbyists to actively protest any provision in the MAl 
draft text or similar provision of any international agreement that would 
restrict San Francisco's ability to regulate within its jurisdiction, decide 
how to use its public procurement dollars, and extend benefits to 
encourage local economic development in a manner consistent with the 
U.S. Constitution. (Public Citizen, 1998) 
Similar resolutions were passed across Canada and the US. 
NGO advocacy at the domestic level resulted in some governments shifting their 
policy positions on the MAL As a result of public pressure, Canadian negotiators had 
become wary of the MAl's corporate mandate and were in no position to endorse the 
continuation of the negotiations4. In France, pressure from the Green and Communist 
factions of the coalition government resulted in France pulling out of the meetings 
(Lalumiere et al. 1998). Consequently, the French government's withdrawal from the 
MAl negotiations represented the end of negotiations. Officially, the rest of the MAl 
negotiating group acknowledged that the negotiations had failed when on December 3, 
1998 OECD announced that MAl negotiations had been halted permanently. 
4. 7 Why Did the MAl Negotiations Fail? 
The MAl negotiations failed for four mam reasons. First, negotiating m the 
OECD was a problem as many of the OECD countries would have preferred to negotiate 
4 By the end of negotiations , "governments everywhere found at least something wrong with the draft 
agreement" (Walter 200 I, 62) . 
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investment rules at the WTO (Kobrin 1998; Smythe 2001). As well, the OECD's narrow 
membership did not include developing countries, which were one of the key targets of 
the TNCs. Second, the MAl negotiators' inability to agree on basic principles of the MAl 
contributed significantly to the MAl's failure (Kobrin 1998). The TNCs ' refusal to accept 
environmental, cultural, and labour concerns made it impossible for most politicians to 
sign the MAL Ultimately, the relationship between TNCs and government negotiators 
broke down as governments adapted to public pressure. 
Third, the OECD negotiating group underestimated the effect of keeping the MAl 
negotiations secret. When the draft copy of the MAl was leaked to Public Citizen, the 
NGO campaign was given a focus : a secret document that threatened democracy and 
sovereignty. The NGO campaign mobilized and was able to spread information quickly. 
Even some governments were surprised by the secrecy of the negotiations. In one 
instance: "[n]ot even the U.S. congressional committees with direct jurisdiction over 
international commerce or investment had been briefed, although the U.S. State and 
Treasury Departments ha[ d) spearheaded the MAl talks for three years" (Public Citizen 
2007). In fact, US government officials denied the existence of an MAl text until the 
MAl draft text was leaked in late January of 1997. Public Citizen (2007) reported, 
When a Member of the US Congress demanded to know why he had not 
been informed of the negotiations, the US government claimed numerous 
briefings had been conducted and sent a list of meetings no invitee could 
recall. When a different Member of Congress asked the same question to a 
different official, he was given a totally different "list" of alleged 
briefings. 
As a result of keeping the MAl negotiations secret, the MAl negotiators had a difficult 
time trying to fend of attacks that the MAl was undemocratic and a threat to sovereignty. 
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Fourth, as implied in the examples above, NGOs played a significant role in the 
OECD's failure to successfully negotiate the MAl (Kobrin 1998; Mingst and Warkentin 
2000; Smythe 2000; Walter 2001). Through a broad-based coalition that benefited from 
the breadth of its public reach, NGOs learned that by working together, they were able to 
utilize their resources and push their campaigns around the world via e-mail, the World 
Wide Web, and other media sources. By sharing information about the MAl, NGOs 
shaped the way the debate played out in the public arena (Walter 2001). For example, the 
NGO campaign benefited by gaining broad public support as a result of labelling the 
MAl as an enemy of democracy. The loose structure of the coalition allowed each NGO 
to pursue its own MAl agenda. As a result, a crosspollination of ideas occurred as NGOs 
attacked the agreement on individual terms (Mingst and Warkentin 2000). 
4. 7.1 The MAl Negotiators' Perspectives on the Effectiveness of the NGO 
Campaign 
MAl negotiators admitted that NGOs had influenced the policy outcome. For 
example, the report that explains France's reasons for leaving the MAl negotiations 
stated, "the MAl has created opposition and tension within civil society. The extent and 
strength of the opposition and the speed with which it developed were surprising" 
(Lalumiere, et. al., 1998). Similarly, other European delegates stated that growing NGO 
pressure exacerbated the differences in opinions in the OECD (Mingst and Warkentin 
2000). In speaking about future trade negotiations, Renato Ruggiero (1998), director-
general of the WTO, also recognized the role ofNGOs: 
We are making progress toward improving our information exchange and 
consultation with civil society. These measures are the first step in our 
enhanced co-operation and represent the start of an on-going collaboration 
with partner NGOs, which we fully expect will offer important benefits for 
all parties concerned. 
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Therefore, the MAl negotiators argue that NGO campatgnmg affected the MAl's 
negotiations. 
4.8 The Canadian Context 
The Canadian foreign policy position on the MAl was affected by the same 
factors that led to the overall failure of the MAl negotiations. First, Canadian officials 
were advocates of using the WTO and were relieved that the OECD negotiations failed 
(Smythe 2001). The Canadian government never reneged on its foreign policy position of 
being in favour of an international investment agreement. Therefore, the Canadian 
government remained in favour of international investment agreements, but it was not 
willing to pursue the MAl in the OECD (Smythe 2001 ). 
Second, Canadian negotiators were unable to agree to the strict principles of 
international investment that were being advocated by the TNCs. Team Canada missions 
are situated on "a terrain in which the economic is completely separate from the 
political," but the MAl negotiations crossed into the political sphere with the issue of 
sovereignty as well as those of the environmental, labour, and cultural rights (de 
Larrinaga and Turenne Sjolander 2000, 45). Since the negotiations had become bogged 
down in disagreement, the Canadian negotiators were eager to discontinue the game of 
political football (Smythe 2001 , 156). 
Third, the Canadian government was forced to deal with the Canadian public's 
anger over the secrecy of the MAl negotiations. The MAl had not been a major issue in 
the June 1997 federal election (although the NDP did raise the issue), and many Liberal 
backbenchers and opposition members were completely unaware of the negotiations. 
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However, after being hit by the secrecy charge, the minister of International Trade asked 
the House of Commons on Foreign Affairs and International Trade "to hold hearings in 
the fall of 1997, and ensured that an ad hoc process of consultation, and more 
information on the negotiations, was made available to the public" (Smythe 2001 , 155: 
See Section 4.6). The Canadian government was thus unable to separate its economic 
objectives from its political principles. 
Fourth, the anti-MAl NGO campaign affected the Canadian government's policy 
position on the MAL NGO campaign strategies targeted and were successful in engaging 
Canadian politicians (as described in section 4.5). As a result of the NGO campaign 
raising the profile of the MAl foreign policy issue, the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade assessed the MAl draft and 
Canada's role in it, and was critical of some of the provisions (Smythe 2001: First 
described in section 4.6) . Canada' s involvement in the negotiations was endorsed, so the 
anti-MAl campaign did not change Canada's position on an international investment 
agreement. Nevertheless, the NGO campaign, in the Canadian context, was successful in 
its protests and lobbying and World Wide Web and media campaigns to contribute to the 
failure of the MAl (Smythe 2001 , 156). In the next section, the NGO campaign against 
the MAl is summarized. 
4.9 Summary of the NGO Campaign Against the MAl 
The failure ofthe MAl is the result of the OECD's unsuccessful role as host ofthe 
MAl negotiations, the inability of negotiators to agree, a secretive negotiating process, 
and the international NGO campaign that exacerbated each of the above problems while 
also facilitating intense public pressure against the MAL The NGO campaign 
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experienced success in lobbying political parties (both in opposition and in power) as 
well as in participating in more traditional street-level protests (Laxer 2003). 
Furthermore, the campaign against the MAl used traditional (lobby strategies) and non-
traditional (e-mail and the World Wide Web) means to stop the MAL By mounting a 
broad-based campaign with a clear focus and strong public support, the international 
NGO campaign against the MAl was effective in contributing to the failure of the MAL 
5.0 Comparing the Campaign Against the MAl to Chapman and Fishers' 
Taxonomy 
In the chart below, the international NGO campaign against the MAl is compared 
to Chapman and Fisher's taxonomy. 
Table 4.1: Comparing the Campaign to Block the Signing of the MAl Against Chapman 
and Fishers' Taxonomy 
Variables 
l.Timeline 
How does the variable contribute to the international 
campaign against the MAl's effectiveness in achieving a policy 
change? 
• 
• 
Campaigning over time led to precipitative moments which 
contributed directly to the MAl's failure. 
o The Canadian NGO campaigns that fought NAFTA 
took a leadership role in the campaign against the 
MAl. 
o The leaked MAl draft document provided a focal 
point for the NGO campaign. 
o The NGO campaign contributed to France leaving 
the MAl negotiations. 
The NGO campaign against the MAl is part of a larger 
protest against the injustices of globalization; it has no 
clear end. 
o Unlike in the case of landmines, the MAl did not 
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2.Concurrent 
work 
3.Collaboration 
• 
• 
• 
end with a convention, so the end of MAl 
negotiations did not equal the end of international 
investment agreement negotiations. 
• Campaigning over time led to better-established links 
between NGOs. 
• The NGO campaign against the MAl was conducted at 
many different levels (grassroots, national, international) 
and, within these, in different arenas (communities, local 
governments, national governments, OECD). 
• Concurrent work helped build the NGO campaign' s 
momentum. 
• Work done in each of the arenas contributed to the MAl's 
failure. 
o Campaigning at the state-level contributed to 
problems in the MAl negotiations. 
o Targeting vulnerable governments (France) 
contributed to the MAl's failure. 
• A mix of "insider" and "outsider" strategies were used. 
o Insider = NGO campaign was invited to a meeting 
with OECD negotiators. 
• Although the campaign was not granted its 
request of a suspension, the campaign was 
given publicity. 
o Outsider = Nearly the entire campatgn was 
conducted outside of the OECD negotiations. 
NGOs used many different strategies (see Section 
4.5). 
Organizational structure = Web 
As more players become involved, the NGO campaign was 
strengthened. 
Collaboration between NGOs (coalition building, TAN 
building, and information sharing via e-mail and the World 
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4.Legitimacy 
5.Individuals and 
mobilizing people 
6.Narrow focus 
7.Role 
government 
judiciary 
of 
and 
Wide Web helped move a campaign forward. 
o The World Wide Web and email were particularly 
effective campaign strategies. 
• NGO campaign against the MAl brought legitimacy with 
established NGOs like the Council for Canadians and the 
Polaris Institute. 
• The NGO campaign earned legitimacy with the public by 
releasing the MAl draft. 
o NGO campaign promoted democracy and 
transparency. 
o Resulted m a broad movement supported m 
principal by civil society. 
• Specific individuals like Murray Dobbin, Maude Barlow, 
Tony Clarke, and hundreds of other NGO leaders and 
activists contributed to the NGO campaign against the 
MAl moving forward. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
o The campaign did not have the star power of the 
ICBL. 
Campaign mobilized NGOs, groups, and individuals from 
around the world, especially in North America and Europe. 
Grassroots were opposed to the MAl and the OECD's 
secretive negotiations; they were instrumental in pushing 
governments away from the original MAl principles. 
Narrow focus = stop the MAl negotiations 
Campaign has broadened to tackle the WTO, the FT AA, 
and as well as other concerns of globalization. 
Governments = Canadian and French governments 
demanded that their cultural industries be left out of the 
agreement, which contributed to weakening of the original 
MAl principles and the breakdown of negotiations. 
NGO campaign worked at the provincial/state and regional 
levels; some municipalities went to court against the MAL 
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8.International 
context 
9 .Implementation 
and monitoring 
lO.Tools 
• National law = Campaign lobbied all levels of government 
to oppose the MAL 
• International conventions = NGOs argued that the MAl 
violated International Human Rights Law. 
o This argument was not as convincing as in the case 
of landmines. 
• The international context of the NGO campaign against the 
MAl contributed the MAl's failure: NGOs networked and 
shared information. 
• 
• 
o Campaign was international, broad-based and 
contained a diverse group of NGOs, individuals, 
and groups. 
o Campaign used e-mail and the World Wide Web to 
spread information and to organize. 
The MAl has not resurfaced, but the FT AA negotiations 
have included talks on an international investment 
agreement; the NGO campaign continues to advocate for 
fair trade and the protection of the environment, labour, 
and communities. 
In 1998, the Council for Canadians published The MAl 
Inquiry: Confronting Globalization and Reclaiming 
Democracy, which surveyed Canadians' feelings about the 
MAl and their ideas for what an international investment 
agreement should look like. 
Codes of conduct = Campaign established a code of conduct for 
transparency. The MAl was labelled as undemocratic and a threat 
to sovereignty. 
Labelling = Does not apply. 
Social Auditing = Campaign against the MAl no longer exists, but 
the anti-globalization campaign continues to advocate for global 
justice issues. 
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11. Work at the 
grassroots 
• Grassroots involvement is essential to ensuring real and 
sustained change. 
• Campaign worked hard to educate society about the threat 
the MAl posed to the environment, labour, and 
communities. 
• Public pressure influenced MAl policy positions. 
In summary, all eleven of Chapman and Fishers' variables for NGO effectiveness 
are evident in the story of how the international NGO campaign against the MAl 
achieved a policy change. It is interesting that although the campaign against the MAl did 
not have a positive relationship with MAl negotiators, they were able to use the same 
basic set of variables as the ICBL. Aside from the fact that communication strategies ( e-
mail and World Wide Web) played key roles in the MAl's failure, Chapman and Fishers ' 
taxonomy' s variables prove to be consistent with the variables that contributed to the 
ICBL's effectiveness. 
In Chapter 5, the landmines campaign and the MAl campaign are compared in 
context to the variables of effectiveness from Chapman and Fishers' taxonomy. 
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CHAPTER 5: COMPARING THE INTERNATIONAL NGO CAMPAIGNS TO 
BAN LANDMINES AND THE MAl AGAINST CHAPMAN AND FISHER'S 
TAXONOMY 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter it will be seen that the variables from Jennifer Chapman and 
Thomas Fisher's taxonomy on NGO effectiveness were evident and contributed - to 
varying degrees - to the effectiveness of the international NGO campaigns to ban 
landmines and to stop the MAl negotiations. While there are a number of commonalities 
between the cases, there are also many differences which represent the idiosyncratic and 
complex nature ofNGO campaigns. 
Variable 1: Timeline 
Campaigning over time may lead to precipitative moments which may have a major 
impact in terms of change in policy and practice. 
Campaigning over time contributed to both NGO campaigns affecting 
international policy changes; however, the ICBL's campaign spanned two decades and 
benefited from precipative moments that moved the campaign along its timeline. The 
ICBL is a product ofNGO activity surrounding the UN's CCW (1980) and the grassroots 
work of field doctors in the 1980s and the early 1990s. The official start was November 
22, 1995, the launch date of the ICBL's international campaign. As a result of the 
international campaign, landmines were placed on the policy agenda of many world 
governments, several whom eventually shifted their policies towards a ban on landmines. 
Three key moments in the campaign had major impacts in terms of change in 
policy and practice. First, the ICRC persuaded the UN to put the landmines issue on the 
international policy agenda; second, the US made a policy change and signed a one-year 
78 
moratorium on landmines; and, third, Canada emerged as a leading proponent for issuing 
a ban on landmines by initiating the Ottawa Process. Each of these events was significant 
for moving the campaign along its timeline and towards a policy change, which resulted 
in an international convention. Thus the timeline of the lCBL saw the NGO campaign 
begin with a policy objective of banning landmines and end with the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction. 
Similarly, campaigning over time contributed to the campaign against the MAl's 
effectiveness. The campaign against the MAl occurred over a brief period in the late 
1990s, but similar to the campaign against landmines, it has its roots in a broader 
movement, in this case the movement against free trade agreements (ex. campaigns 
against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Larson 1998; Lynch 1999; 
MAl-Not!)). 
Like the campaign against landmines, three key precipitative moments had major 
impacts in terms of change in policy and practice in the campaign against the MAL The 
first of these moments was in late January 1997 when a 90 percent complete draft of the 
MAl was leaked to Public Citizen. This led to the world wide campaign against the MAL 
Campaigners focused on the objective of blocking MAl negotiations. A second 
precipitative moment was when the OECD was chosen to host the MAl negotiations. The 
OECD was contested by participants, and negotiators who could not agree on core 
principles. Third, French negotiators pulled out of the MAl negotiations which signaled 
the end of the MAl talks on October 28, 1998. Therefore, the NGO campaign against the 
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MAl began with the release of the MAl draft and ended when the MAl negotiations 
failed. 
In conclusion, the campaigns against landmines and the MAl benefited from 
precipitative moments that had major impact in terms of change in policy and practice. 
However, it is significant that while the ICBL was concluded with an international 
convention, the NGO campaign against the MAl concluded with an end to negotiations, 
but not an end to the policy work around an international investment agreement. 
Therefore, Chapman and Fishers' Variable 1 contributed to the international NGO 
campaigns against landmines and MAl achieving policy changes, but in context to two 
different outcomes. 
Variable 2: Concurrent work 
To be effective, work has to be conducted at many different levels and, within these, in 
different arenas, which may target other groups and may lead to the broadening of the 
campaign. 
Both NGO campatgns conducted work at three different levels (international, 
national, grassroots) and in many different arenas (ex, UN, national governments, 
regional governments, judiciaries, industry, communities, and individuals). As a result, 
the campaigns were inclusive and received broad-based support. As noted in Chapter 3, 
the ICBL's workers operated at the international, national, and grassroots levels (Beier 
and Crosby 1998). First, ICBL groups worked at the international level in several arenas: 
international judiciary, the UN, international NGOs, national governments, and the voting 
public. Second, at the national level the ICBL partnered with national NGOs, lobbied 
public opinion, and encouraged officials in national governments to adopt a policy shift 
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on landmines. Third, at the grassroots level the ICBL collected and published data and 
used the media to facilitate publicity campaigns designed to promote awareness of the 
landmines problem. As a result, work done at different levels and in different arenas, 
contributed to the ICBL's effectiveness in achieving the MBT. 
The work conducted at different levels and in different arenas was interconnected, 
so work in one area spurred progress in other areas. For example, as noted in section 3.2, 
work at the grassroots level provided the ICBL with photographs, data, and anecdotal 
evidence against landmines, all of which helped to crystallize the importance of banning 
landmines in other arenas. In many countries, widespread public support for a ban on 
landmines was a result of the ICBL's public awareness campaigns. As a result, the 
ICBL's membership and public support for a landmines ban increased. 
Similarly, the campaign against the MAl was conducted at the international, 
national and grassroots levels and was conducted at each of these levels in a number of 
arenas. First, at the international level, the campaign against the MAl created coalitions 
ofNGOs around the world, especially in OECD countries, and lobbied the voting public, 
national governments, TNCs, and the OECD. At the national level, the NGO campaign 
lobbied national and regional government officials to drop out of MAl negotiations. 
National and regional judiciaries were used to push legal pressure points over 
sovereignty-related issues. Cultural industries and environmental and labour groups were 
lobbied to create momentum against the MAl, and campaigns in France and Canada were 
especially effective at instigating state-level debates against the MAL At the grassroots 
level, the NGO campaign used e-mail and the World Wide Web to educate individuals, 
families, communities, and grassroots NGOs on the MAL As a result of work being done 
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at the above three levels in the different arenas, the NGO campaign against the MAl was 
broadened. 
Like the lCBL, the campaign against the MAl's concurrent work was 
interconnected. First, work at the international level (ex, NGO coalition building and 
information sharing) fuelled momentum for national and community lobby efforts. For 
example, international information sharing facilitated ideas and information between the 
levels and within the various arenas (ex, national NGOs, community groups, individuals) 
which contributed to increased awareness of the campaign's objectives, and in tum, 
contributed to an increase in support for the campaign. 
The examples described above illustrate how the campaigns against landmines 
and the MAl had to conduct work at many different levels and, within these, in different 
arenas, which broadened their campaigns and contributed to their overall effectiveness. 
Therefore, Chapman and Fishers' Variable 2 contributed to the international NGO 
campaigns against landmines and MAl achieving policy changes. 
Variable 3: Collaboration 
To campaign effectively, a mix of "insider" and "outsider" strategies are needed 
although the overall strategy of each NGO remains characterized predominately by one 
or the other. 
For both the landmines and MAl campaigns, a mix of insider and outsider 
strategies were needed to be effective. However, the lCBL was characterized by its 
insider strategies while the campaign against the MAl was characterized by its outsider 
strategies. First, the lCBL 's leadership is argued to have had a successful insider 
relationship with officials from the Canadian government, and this is widely celebrated as 
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the first working relationship between members of NGOs and Canadian government 
departments, officials and parliamentarians that resulted in a significant policy change 
(Axworthy 2004). Although the ICBL is characterized predominately by insider 
strategies, outsider strategies were also used as NGOs networked, collaborated, and 
lobbied governments. For instance, the ICBL used an international educational campaign 
to create grassroots support for a ban, which, in turn, contributed to the lobby directed at 
government officials. 
The campaign against the MAl was limited in its use of insider strategies because 
the MAl was negotiated in relative secrecy: the OECD held "quiet, behind the scenes 
negotiations" (Gale 1997, par. I). As a result, the NGO campaign membership was not 
invited to contribute to the MAl discussion as NGO members had been during the Ottawa 
Process. Furthermore, the campaign against the MAl was characterized by the use of 
outsider strategies: information gathering and sharing, public rallies, and letter writing 
campaigns. For example, after the MAl draft document was released, the NGO campaign 
used e-mail and the World Wide Web to spread public awareness and to create 
momentum against the MAL The use of e-mail and the World Wide Web during the 
campaign against the MAl was the key contributing factor to the effectiveness of the 
outsider strategies (Mingst andWarkentin 2000). 
In addition to its emphasis on the outsider strategies, the campaign against the 
MAl used insider strategies as well. For instance, members of the NGO campaign's 
leadership met with the MAl negotiators once on October 27, 1997. Although the 
meeting was unsuccessful, it helped the NGO campaign workers build momentum 
against the MAl by drawing the media's attention to the campaign and by highlighting 
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sensitive Jssues within the agreement, which encouraged disagreements within the 
negotiations. As a result, the campaign against the MAl - although predominately 
characterized by the use of outsider strategies- also used insider strategies. 
Moreover, the conditions surrounding the landmines and MAl policy Jssues 
contributed to whether or not and how NGOs were able to interact with policy makers. 
On the one hand, the Canadian government was willing to work with the lCBL leadership 
in facilitating the MBT. On the other hand, state-level governments were not willing to 
work with NGOs who were part of the campaign to stop the MAL 
Although the lCBL is characterized by insider strategies and the campa1gn 
against the MAl is characterized by outsider strategies, both campaigns used a 
combination of the two approaches, and in both cases, the approaches contributed to 
NGO campaign effectiveness. Therefore, the extent to which policy makers were willing 
to engage NGOs contributed to which strategy the NGO campaign leadership favoured. 
Consequently, the lCBL and the campaign against the MAl are in agreement with 
Chapman and Fishers' Variable 3. 
Variable 4: Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is essential for effective campaigning and for raising resources. 
Earning legitimacy was essential for both the lCBL and the campaign against the 
MAl for effective campaigning and raising funds. The lCBL used campaign strategies 
(ex, information gathering and sharing, media and education campaigns, letter writing 
campaigns, government lobbies) to earn broad-based support from grassroots, 
governments, and the UN. As a result, the lCBL was able to earn the trust of some 
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government officials (ex, Bob Lawson, Lloyd Axworthy) and eventually to raise -
although it was a constant struggle - enough funds to host the landmine ban negotiations 
(ICRC 1999). In addition, NGO expertise spurred the UN to commit resources to 
landmine clearance, and it also helped facilitate the creation of the ICBL's TAN which 
helped persuade 144 of the world ' s governments to sign the Ottawa Treaty (Flynn 2004). 
In fact, the ICBL's field expertise was the reason it was invited to participate in 
government-sponsored landmine conferences and meetings. 
Some officials in the military departments of governments contested the ICBL' s 
legitimacy. Kenneth Rutherford (2004), for example, suggested that many of the NGO-
generated statistics were "inflated" and "regurgitated by the media without proper fact 
checking and research" (56). As well, Michael Flynn (2004) stated that although the UN 
estimated in the 1990s that there were 100 million landmines worldwide, it was highly 
unlikely that the number could be proved (117) . 
In addition to earning legitimacy with grassroots and government, the ICBL had 
to compete for funds with de-mining NGOs. Instead of facilitating the MBT, de-mining 
NGOs argued that the money could be better spent in mine removal activities. The ICBL 
attempted to address the de-mining lobby by citing its first priority in the solutions to the 
landmines problem as removing mines from the ground (ICBL, Solutions). The de-
mining NGOs have also been brought into the ICBL to play an important role in 
monitoring states for Treaty compliance. As a result, the ICBL earned legitimacy with 
grassroots, governments, and de-mining NGOs. 
In the case of the MAl, both the MAl negotiations and the campaign against the 
MAl were contested. On the one hand, MAl negotiators and supporters argued (after the 
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MAl had been leaked) that the MAl's intention was "to protect the rights of international 
investors," essentially giving corporations equal standing with nations, at least in respect 
to investment legalities and practices (Rauber 1998, 16). Canada' s Department ofF oreign 
Affairs and International Trade (DF AIT) (1998) argued, for example, that a multilateral 
agreement on investment was in Canada' s best interest: "an internationally accepted set 
of rules for the treatment of foreign investment is highly desirable in today ' s economy" 
(par. 7). On the other hand, NGOs argued that the MAl was an attack on democracy, 
sovereignty, and community rights. For example, Public Citizen (1997) and Naomi Klein 
(1997) argued the MAl would result in the degradation of laws protecting labour and the 
environment as the MAl would make it illegal for countries to try to prevent job flight or 
to impose job creation or community reinvestment provisions on foreign investors and 
the environment. In addition, NGO leaders claimed that the MAl was undemocratic as 
the OECD had decided to hold the MAl negotiations in secret. By way of investigation 
and information dissemination, the campaign against the MAl became civil society' s 
primary source for MAl information. As a result, the NGO campaign earned its 
legitimacy with grassroots. 
By encouraging debate within the MAl negotiations over cultural industries and 
environmental and labour rights, the campaign against the MAl also earned a certain 
level of legitimacy with some MAl negotiators. In countries like France and Canada, the 
NGO campaign contributed to the state-level governments being forced to back away 
from the MAl's core principles. Therefore, NGOs played on the divisions between MAl 
negotiators. It is important to point out, however, that the NGO campaign was effective 
in leveraging its influence over state-level policies having to do with the MAl, but it was 
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not effective in influencing policy makers against the basic principles of an international 
investment deal. 
Legitimacy was essential for moving the ICBL and the campaign against the MAl 
forward. The ICBL earned legitimacy with grassroots as well as governments. The 
campaign against the MAl earned legitimacy with grassroots which was turned into 
momentum to target the divisions between MAl negotiators. As a result, Chapman and 
Fishers' Variable 4 contributed to effectiveness of the ICBL and the campaign against 
landmines. 
Variable 5: Individuals and mobilizing people 
Specific individuals, who have a flair for motivating people and who have a combined 
social conscience and strategic vision, are crucial to the process at both the national and 
grassroots level. 
For both the ICBL and the campaign against the MAl, specific individuals with 
key leadership abilities were crucial to the policy process at both the grassroots, national, 
and international levels. In the case of landmines, the work of Cornelio Sommaruga and 
the ICRC staff is an example of effective grassroots' leadership. At the Canadian 
national level, Andre Ouellet, Lloyd Axworthy, and Jean Chretien contributed to moving 
the ICBL along its timeline. As noted previously, Lloyd Axworthy advanced the ICBL's 
policy objective by initiating the Ottawa Process. At a time when strong national 
leadership was required to move the idea of a ban out of negotiations and into a policy 
process, Axworthy offered to facilitate the Ottawa Process, which ultimately led to the 
MBT. Pope Jean Paul, the Dalai Lama, Boutras Boutras Ghali, Princess Diana, and Jody 
Williams are examples of key individuals who advanced the process of banning 
landmines at the international levels. The landmines campaign, with strong NGO, 
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celebrity, and political individuals having contributed to the campaign, strongly suggests 
that key individuals with vision and leadership skills are important for moving a 
campaign forward. 
The results of the campaign against the MAl also supports the need for key 
individuals to move a campaign forward as evidenced by such NGO leaders as Maude 
Barlow, Tony Clarke, Ralph Nader, and Murray Dobbin who helped facilitate the 
international campaign against the MAl at the grassroots, national, and international 
levels. For example, Barlow, the national chairperson of the Council for Canadians, took 
a leadership role in publishing information about the MAl and its potential effects. She 
wrote MAl: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Threat to Canadian 
Sovereignty (1997) with Tony Clarke, MAl: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
and the Threat to American Freedom (1998), and MAl: The Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment Round 2: New Global and Internal Threats to Canadian Sovereignty (1998) 
again with Tony Clarke. In publishing information against the MAl, Barlow spread the 
campaign's message, legitimized the campaign's objective, and created publicity 
opportunities for the campaign thus raising its profile at the grassroots and international 
levels. Barlow and other NGO leaders shifted the MAl discussion from within the OECD 
to the public domain where the MAl's implications to the environmental, human rights, 
and democratic governance where shown (Mingst and Warkentin 2000). 
Although the MAl's key figures were often less prominent, in terms of their 
celebrity and accolades, than those of the landmines campaign, they were still effective in 
moving their campaign towards a policy goal. This is significant because Chapman and 
Fisher's variables do not include the potential influence of celebrities over an 
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international policy issue. In the case of the ICBL, celebrities like Diana, Princess of 
Wales generated an enormous amount of media attention which contributed to the mass 
popularity of the campaign (English 1998). 
As outlined above, key individuals in each campaign were extremely helpful in 
educating and mobilizing people at the grassroots level and in moving the campaigns 
along their timelines at the national level. However, the ICBL had a lot more celebrity 
cache than the campaign against the MAl, which contributed to the NGO campaign being 
made effective. Consequently, the ICBL and the campaign against the MAl are 
fundamentally in agreement with Chapman and Fishers' Variable 5. 
Variable 6: Narrow focus 
A narrow focus can be extremely effective in getting an issue formulated and in ensuring 
progress. 
A narrow focus was important in getting the NGO-sponsored landmines and MAl 
policy issues formulated and in ensuring that progress was made along their timelines. 
Both the ICBL and the NGO campaign against the MAl consisted of hundreds of NGOs, 
which made having a narrow focus essential to each of the campaign's effectiveness. A 
major reason for the landmines campaigns' successes were the simplicity of their 
arguments. As Price (1998) argues, "a blanket taboo is much easier to understand than 
complex restrictions on how mines can be used" (111). Rutherford (2004) adds that the 
ICBL had the advantage of being able to narrow its focus on the landmines issue to argue 
for a complete ban, which increased its value to governments involved in the landmines 
discussions. 
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Similarly, the campaign against the MAl benefited from a single, clear focus. The 
campaign coalesced under the objective of blocking the MAl. Although the NGO 
campaign produced alternative draft ideas for the MAl (thus implying that some version 
of the MAl could be adopted), the campaign's purpose was to highlight the fact that the 
OECD's MAl was unacceptable. By making the MAl debate into an ultimatum of sorts, 
the campaign was successful in its objective of contributing to the failure of the MAl 
negotiations. As a result, Chapman and Fishers' Variable 6 is proven to be consistent 
with the ICBL and the NGO campaign against the MAL 
Variable 7: Role of government and judiciary 
Governments, national law, and international conventions need to be involved to get 
legal frameworks in place, ensure the law is implemented, carry out large programmes 
for which NGOs cannot raise the necessary resources, change practice and attitudes in 
government-run institutions, and give permanency. 
The campaigns against landmines and the MAl needed governments, national law 
and international conventions to get the legal frameworks of their desired policy changes 
in place, to ensure that the policy changes were implemented, to carry out large 
programmes (in some cases), to change government policy positions, and to give 
permanency to policy changes. For example, state-level governments helped advance the 
landmines policy agenda as is evidenced in Chapter 3, Section 3.5. First, the US signed a 
one-year moratorium on landmines, which set precedence for other state's (like members 
of the EU) to pursue legislation. Second, other European states like Belgium and Austria 
attempted to facilitate a ban, and third, Canada initiated the Ottawa Process and 
facilitated the MBT. Third, rather than use national laws, the ICBL worked to influence 
the foreign policy positions of state-level government departments. Having officials like 
90 
George Bush Sr. who agreed to a one year moratorium and then later Canadian Foreign 
Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy who agreed to a ban on landmines, the ICBL gained 
momentum to advocate for an international treaty. In addition to governments and 
national law, interntional human rights legislation, which was used to set the interntional 
landmines policy agenda, helped facilitate the effectiveness of the ICBL. The ICBL 
claimed that APMs were illegal under international humanitarian law because they were 
"indiscriminate, failed to balance military utility against human suffering and flouted 
laws relating to the protection of the environment" (Croll 1998, 134). In fact, Protocol 1 
of the Geneva Conventions states that landmines are illegal (134). As a result, the legal 
framework for the MBT was set out by international conventions. Therefore, the ICBL's 
effectiveness was reliant on governments, national law, and international conventions. 
The NGO campaign against the MAl also benefited from governments, national 
law, and international conventions. Lobbying government officials was key to the 
campaign ' s effectiveness as the representatives from the French and Canadian 
governments (largely as a result of NGO lobbying and, in turn, grassroots pressure) 
refused to agree to key principles in the MAl draft. Eventually, the French government 
representative left the MAl negotiations, which ultimately signalled the end of the MAL 
In addition to governments, the NGO campaign promoted provinciaVstate and federal 
laws that protect sovereignty (specifically in Canada and the US as discussed in Section 
4.6). Consequently, the campaign was able to brand the MAl as undemocratic which 
generated public interest and dissatisfaction with the MAl and its negotiating process. 
The campaign against the MAl's workers argued that the MAl was in opposition to the 
goals and objectives of International Human Rights Law Law (Archer et. al. 2007). For 
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example, the MAl's National Treatment provisions would have limited a state's power to 
promote the development of its own populace and resources as required under 
international treaties (Archer, et al. 2007). Consequently, the campaign against the MAl-
like the ICBL -used governments, national laws, and international conventions, which is 
consistent with Chapman and Fisher's Variable 7, to achieve their campaign objectives. 
Variable 8: International context 
The international context of an NGO campaign can influence its effectiveness: 
collaboration between NGOs from different counties, international conventions, and 
coverage of an issue in the international media. 
The international contexts (in specific reference to collaborations, conventions, 
and media coverage) of the ICBL and the campaign against the MAl influenced their 
effectiveness in achieving policy outcomes. Rather than focus again on how the 
campaigns used international conventions as was discussed above in Variable 7, it will be 
shown that the ICBL recognized the need to create a broad-based international coalition 
(Rutherford 2004, 57). In fact, the ICBL's membership included NGOs concerned with a 
wide range of issues, "including arms control and disarmament, economic and social 
development, human rights, and refugee assistance" (60). Paul Wapner (2004) stated that 
the ICBL grew from an initial membership of two NGOs in 1991 (VVAF-USA and 
Medico International-Germany) to over one thousand NGOs from seventy countries in 
seven years (254). 
The ICBL's organizational structure was important to its overall effectiveness. 
For example, Jody Williams (2000) argued that the strengths of the ICBL were that it had 
a loose structure, it was a "true coalition made up of independent NGOs," and it had 
"never [been] a secretariat or central office" (88). The NGOs of the ICBL, according to 
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Williams, came together with "the common goal of banning landmines," but there was 
never "an overarching, bureaucratic structure" telling members how to contribute to the 
campaign, and so the ICBL "deliberately did not establish a central office; each NGO had 
to find a way to participate in making the campaign work" (89). The structure was 
designed to ensure that the ICBL "belonged" to all of its members (Williams 2000), but 
the ICBL's secretariat maintained a clear focus. According to Rutherford, the ICBL's 
ability to speak on behalf of its membership with a unified, clear message was the key to 
it being effective when communicating at conferences and when addressing state 
representatives and the media (60). Thus, the ICBL's style of collaboration contributed to 
its effectiveness. 
The ICBL was effective at communicating with the international media because 
the campaign used images and statistics to advance its agenda. Pictures of landmine 
victims combined with comprehensive statistics gave the ICBL stunning anecdotal 
evidence in support of a ban on landmines. Therefore, collaborating in a loosely 
structured TAN and using the international media to highlight the atrocities caused by 
landmines onto civilians contributed to the ICBL's effectiveness. 
Similarly, the campaign against the MAl's effectiveness was determined by its 
international context, which was limited almost completely to OECD countries. The 
campaign against the MAl was built around a coalition of state level and international 
level NGOs like the Council of Canadians, the Sierra Club, the Polaris Institute, and 
Public Citizen. The NGO coalition' s strength was concentrated in North America and 
Europe (OECD countries), but the campaign worked in every OECD country as well as 
in many developing countries. These NGOs, according to Walter (2001), provided a focal 
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point for the mobilization of general opposition to the MAl and was central to publicity 
campaigns that forced certain MAl negotiators to ask for exceptions to key principles of 
the MAl, which resulted in the collapse of business support ( 62). As a result of lobbying 
many government officials around the world, the campaign was able to exert leverage 
over the MAl negotiators, thus allowing the campaign to influence the policy 
negotiations far beyond their ability to influence state practices directly" (Keck and 
Sikkink 1999). In other words, the international context of the campaign contributed to its 
overall effectiveness. 
In terms of organization, the NGO campaign against the MAl did not have a 
hierarchical or centralized structure. NGO coalition members, like the MAl-Not! website, 
were free to use strategies that they felt were best suited to particular times in the 
campaign. For example, e-mail and the World Wide Web helped NGOs communicate 
MAl news and information. The international context of online communications helped 
the NGO campaign extend and maintain momentum against the MAL As a result, 
pressure could be placed on negotiators from many countries at the same time. In 
addition to international communication, the campaign used the international media to 
facilitate the message that the MAl was undemocratic and a threat to state sovereignty. 
The most important example of the campaign's use of media was in the release of the 
leaked draft text of the MAL The international media became interested in the OECD 
negotiations, which in tum highlighted the NGO campaign's fight against it. 
Consequently, people around the world were given a chance to learn about and debate the 
MAL 
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Therefore, based on the evidence provided, the international contexts for the 
ICBL and the NGO campaign against the MAl contributed to each campaign's 
effectiveness. As a result, the effectiveness of the ICBL and the campaign against the 
MAl was due in part to the international context of each campaign, which is consistent 
with Chapman and Fishers' Variable 8. 
Variable 9: Implementation and monitoring 
The effectiveness of an NGO campaign is dependent on the implementation and 
monitoring of a policy. 
The effectiveness of each campaign was dependent on the implementation and 
monitoring of the policy. In the frrst case, the ICBL's effectiveness is dependent on the 
implementation and monitoring of the MBT, which is evidenced by the MET's increase 
in membership: 155 states from its original 144 (ICBL, States Parties). In addition, the 
ICBL points out that significant progress has been made since the Treaty went into effect 
in 1999. First, production of antipersonnel mines has dropped considerably and trade has 
almost come to a halt. Second, there has been widespread and extensive destruction of 
stockpiled mines: millions of antipersonnel mines have been eradicated and can never 
ever be used. Third, vast tracts of land have been cleared and put back into productive 
use. Fourth, there are now fewer new mine victims each year. Fifth, mine use has halted 
in several countries (like Angola and Sri Lanka) where it had been widespread. Sixth, 
there is a new international norm - where use anywhere by anyone is considered illegal -
is gathering strength. Seventh, more and more states are joining the treaty and working 
hard to implement it fully. Eighth, more non-member states are responding to 
international pressure and abiding by the spirit of the agreement. (ICBL, How will the 
treaty be implemented?) 
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In respect to monitoring the MBT, the Treaty's Article 8 provides for "fact-
finding missions to investigate potential violations of the treaty" (ICBL, Compliance). 
During the Oslo negotiations, most delegations believed an overly intrusive arms control-
type verification and compliance regime was unnecessary in the case of antipersonnel 
mines, so Article 8 is modeled after the international humanitarian law model of fact-
finding (ICBL, Compliance). The implementation and maintenance of the MBT is a 
constant challenge because landmines are still in use, but the current ICBL campaign is 
working to maintain and improve the MBT. 
The campaign against the MAl is differrent from the ICBL in that it concluded 
with a change in a convention or a major shift in intemtional ideology. After the MAl 
negotiations ended in the OECD, they were moved over to the WTO where talks began 
on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FT AA), potentially the most comprehensive free 
trade agreement ever negotiated. It is currently being discussed by 34 countries, many of 
which are OECD members. 
The FTAA, as it now stands, would introduce into the Western 
Hemisphere all the disciplines of the proposed services agreement of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) - the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) - with the powers of the failed Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment (MAl), to create a new trade powerhouse with sweeping 
new authority over the Americas. (Public Citizen, Free Trade Area of the 
Americas) 
Many of the NGOs which were a part of the NGO campaign against the MAl have joined 
the campaign against the FT AA, and at the time of writing this document, there is no 
multilateral agreement on investment. Unlike the ICBL, the NGO campaign against the 
FT AA did not conclude with an international convention, so its ability to maintain a 
policy change is different from that of the ICBL. 
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The effectiveness of the ICBL and the campaign against the MIA are parallel in that both 
campaigns resulted in international policy changes. However, the ICBL's leadership is 
able to concentrate on improving the MBT whereas the NGO campaign against the 
MAl's membership continues to fight against corporate-driven international agreements. 
Variable 10: Tools 
In addition to legislation and conventions, other tools are being developed, such as codes 
of conduct, labelling, and social auditing; these seem to be appropriate when either 
national legislation or international conventions do not exist, or are too weak, too broad 
or unspecific, or when it is problematic to implement them through the legal system or 
government. 
The ICBL developed codes of conduct and social auditing to achieve and 
maintain its policy outcome. First, the MBT promoted a code of conduct stating that 
landmines are both unethical and illegal. Second, in respect to social auditing, the ICBL 
monitors states and organizations that use landmines and publicize violators on its 
website (http://www.icbl.org/). The ICBL also tries to reason with MBT offenders by 
arguing that the effects of landmines on civilians outweighs their military utility. 
Essentially, the ICBL's exercise of codes of conduct and social auditing helped to move 
the policy campaign along its timeline, and it helps to maintain the policy outcome. 
Like the ICBL, the campaign against the MAl used codes of conduct and social 
auditing, first by labelling the MAl "undemocratic" and "a threat to the environment, 
labour rights, and social justice." The campaign's message told that the MAl would give 
more power to corporations while taking rights away from citizens; law firms were hired 
to argue that the MAl was not complaint with existing state laws concerning sovereignty. 
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Although the ICBL leadership made comprehensive use of codes of conduct and social 
auditing to advance their policy agenda, the NGO campaign against the MAl's 
membership relied using codes of conduct to label the MAl negotiating process as 
undemocratic. The NGO campaign against the MAl was able to monitor the policy 
positions of state-level governments, but there was less shame in negotiating the MAl 
than there was in manufacturing or employing landmines. 
Variable II : Work at the grassroots 
Grassroots involvement is essential to ensuring real and sustained change. 
Grassroots involvement was essential to ensuring the effectiveness of the ICBL 
and the campaign against the MAl over time. For the ICBL, grassroots was the key level 
for gathering information on the effects of landmines onto civilians, and in turn was the 
starting point for the international lobby in support of a ban. Furthermore, grassroots 
support for a ban resulted in broad-based public support for political action and an 
aggressive lobby of state-level officials. For example, Lloyd Axworthy (2004) argued 
that the "march [towards the MBT] began, not with governments .. . but with citizen 
groups. They were the ones who eventually yanked officials out of their comfortable 
chairs and forced them into stride" (xvi). As a result, UN officials and state-level 
politicians were swayed to put landmines on the international foreign policy agenda and 
eventually agree to an international policy change. In addition to having contributed to 
the ICBL, the grassroots level is particularly helpful in the maintenance of the MBT. 
There is a thorough account of the current activities of the ICBL in 6. 5.1 of the 
Conclusions. 
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Similar to the ICBL, the campaign against the MAl relied heavily on grassroots 
support to advance its policy campaign, but that support was less organized and was 
smaller in scope than in the case of the ICBL. First, grassroots are significantly affected 
by international trade and investment deals, so they have a significant part to play in how 
these kinds of agreements are negotiated and implemented. In fact, the grassroots level 
produced consistent pressure onto government officials to act democratically and thus to 
protect sovereignty while negotiating the MAL Second, the membership of NGOs in the 
campaign against the MAl were drawn from a cross-section of the grassroots level. For 
example, the Council of Canadians, the Polaris Institute, and Public Citizen represent a 
diverse section of North American society that includes educators, academics, 
environmentalists, trade unionists, politicians, small businesses and numerous other 
groups. The wide representation translated into broad-based support, and public 
participation in the MAl debate strengthened the call for a democratically-orientated MAl 
(Mingst and Warkentin 244). 
However, the NGO campaign against the MAl did not have the scope of the ICBL 
because it was for the most part limited to grassroots' support from OECD countries. As 
well, the grassroots play a key role in the struggle to maintain the policy change if notre-
starting the MAl negotiations, but not having a tangible legal policy change makes 
sustaining grassroots pressure far more abstract and difficult than in the case of 
landmines. 
Therefore, grassroots involvement, for both the NGO campargns against 
landmines and the MAl, was a key to building and sustaining the momentum of the 
campaigns until and after a policy change occurred. The NGO campaign against the 
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MAl, however, is in a more difficult situation than the ICBL due to the condition of not 
having an international policy to support their position. Therefore, the results of the 
analysis of the ICBL and the campaign against the MAl show that Chapman and Fisher's 
Variable I I is consistent with these findings in context to the ICBL and is consistant to 
lesser extent in the case of the campaign against the MAL 
In the following table, the results of the landmines and MAl case studies being 
tested against Chapman and Fisher ' s taxonomy are summarized. 
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Table 5.1: Comparing the NGO Campaigns to Chapman and Fishers' Taxonomy: 
Summary 
Chapman and Fisher's variables of TheNGO TheNGO 
NGO campaign effectiveness campaign against campaign against 
landmines the MAl 
(summary) (summary) 
1. Time line -Campaign - Broader campaign 
occurred over two has long history; 
Campaigning over time may lead to decades and policy MAl campaign 
precipitative moments which may have a was changed due to occurred due to a 
major impact in terms of change in policy "precipitative "precipitative 
and practice. moments" moment" (leaked 
draft) 
2. Concurrent work - Operated at - The grassroots 
international, carried the 
To be effective, work has to be conducted national, and campaign to the 
at many different levels and, within these, grassroots levels national and 
in different arenas, which may target other - campaign was international levels 
groups and may lead to the broadening of broadened - campaign was 
the campaign. broadened 
3. Collaboration -Campaign is -Campaign is 
characterized by characterized by 
To campaign effectively, a mix of insider strategies outsider strategies 
"insider" and "outsider" strategies are NGOs and -Grassroots 
needed although the overall strategy of Canadian pressure onto 
each NGO remains characterized government worked government 
predominately by one or the other. together members 
- ICBL lobbied - NGO leaked the 
governments MAl draft; NGOs 
campaigned against 
pro-MAl 
governments 
4. Legitimacy - Legitimacy was of - Legitimacy was 
central concern to proved by 
Legitimacy is essential for effective the NGO argument discovering the 
campaigning and for raising resources. - NGOs were MAl draft 
landmine experts 
5. Individuals and mobilization of -The ICBL had -Ex, Maude 
groups celebrity cache Barlow, Tony 
Ex, Princess Diana, Clarke (Council of 
Specific individuals, who have a flair for Cornelio Canadians); many 
motivating people and who have a Sommaruga, Lloyd politicians and 
combined social conscience and strategic Axworthy, the NGO leaders 
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vision, are crucial to the process at both Dalai Lama, Jody 
the national and grassroots level. Williams 
6. Narrow focus - Ban landmines - Stop the MAl 
-Narrow focus -Narrow focus 
A narrow focus can be extremely effective encouraged a broad broadened and 
in getting an issue formulated and in and unified strengthened the 
ensunng progress. campaign NGO coalition's 
campaign 
7. Role of government and judiciary -Ex, Ottawa Ex, national law 
Process (Canada); (sovereignty); 
Governments, national law, and international international law 
international conventions need to be humanitarian law; (human rights); 
involved to get legal frameworks in place, Landmines Treaty corporate law 
ensure the law is implemented, carry out 
large programmes for which NGOs cannot 
raise the necessary resources, change 
practice and attitudes in government-run 
institutions, and give permanency. 
8. International context - Transnational - Transnational 
advocacy networks advocacy networks 
The international context of an NGO - Internationalized - Internationalized 
campaign can influence its effectiveness: argument argument 
collaboration between NGOs from Limited to OECD 
different counties, international countries 
conventions, and coverage of an issue in 
the international media. 
9. Implementation and monitoring - ICBL and - NGOs are in 
grassroots are in agreement, but it is 
The effectiveness of an NGO campaign is agreement, but very difficult to 
dependent on the implementation and having an maintain the MAl 
monitoring of a policy. international treaty outcome -it is 
is key to sustaining constantly changing 
change form and venue 
-De-mining - The blocking of 
campaigns argue the MAl was 
for implementation significant for the 
of a landmine free moral of the greater 
world NGO-led anti-
globalization 
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movement 
10. Tools - De-mining lobby - NGOs emphasized 
argues for focus to problematic 
In addition to legislation and conventions, be on getting rid of legalities of the 
other tools are being developed, such as mines as well as on MAl on local and 
codes of conduct, labelling, and social celebrating states state level 
auditing; these seem to be appropriate that do not produce governments 
when either national legislation or them -No specific 
international conventions do not exist, or convention or legal 
are too weak, too broad or unspecific, or agreement 
when it is problematic to implement them supporting the 
through the legal system or government. NGO position 
11. Grassroots involvement - Grassroots are key - Grassroots 
to monitoring and maintain pressure 
Grassroots involvement is essential to enforcing the onto various levels 
ensuring real and sustained change. Treaty of government to 
act fairly when 
negotiating 
economic 
agreements 
-Limited to OECD 
countries 
- Difficulties 
involved in 
sustaining the 
failure of the event. 
5.2 Summary 
In summary, although there are variances within how the variables relate to the 
landmines and MAl issues, the NGO campaigns against landmines and the MAl share a 
consistent set of variables that resulted in campaign effectiveness. Specifically, Chapman 
and Fisher's taxonomy shows how and why the landmines and MAl NGO campaigns 
were effective in achieving policy changes. Each variable of effectiveness shows how 
NGO campaigns need to be dynamic and able to adapt to new conditions. It is also 
significant to note that the taxonomy shows that the variables of effectiveness are 
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interconnected. The taxonomy does not, however, show that there are different kinds of 
policy changes. The ICBL concluded with an international convention whereas the 
campaign against the MAl concluded with the end of MAl negotiation. This fundamental 
difference in policy change affected some of the variables. The results of the comparison 
are summarized below. 
First, timelines and concurrent work each contributed to the campaigns, but the 
campaign against the MAl had a much shorter lifespan than the ICBL. Second, the ICBL 
was characterized by the use of insider strategies whereas the campaign against the MAl 
was characterized by outsider strategies. Both campaigns, however, participated in 
coalitions and TANs. Third, legitimacy was a key to each campaign, although in context 
to individuals, the ICBL had significant celebrity cache. Fourth, both campaigns had and 
benefited from a narrow focus. Fifth, International Humanitarian Law significantly 
affected the ICBL whereas national policy and law were more useful in lobbying against 
the MAL Sixth, both campaigns had international contexts, but the MAl's was limited to 
a significant extent to OECD member countries. Seventh, the ICBL's membership has a 
tangible objective in aiming to improve the MBT whereas the campaign against the MAl 
has a less clear task in sustaining a policy change without a formalized convention. Both 
campaigns used codes of conduct and social auditing, but while the ICBL leadership 
focused on both, the campaign against landmines focused more on codes of conduct. 
Finally, both campaigns relied heavily on grassroots' support. The ICBL, however, is 
more successful in sustaining grassroots focus on policy change than is the campaign 
against landmines due in large part the Mine Ban Treaty. In conclusion, the variables 
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from Chapman and Fisher's taxonomy are evident in both the ICBL and the campaign 
against the MAl, but their contribution to the overall campaigns vary. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
This project makes three central conclusions. First, two international NGO 
campaigns, the ICBL and the campaign against the MAl, were effective in achieving an 
international policy change. Second, both campaigns contributed to CFP shifts (which 
was less clear in the MAl case) that had larger implications to the overall campaigns. 
Third, the variables that contributed to the effectiveness of both the ICBL and the 
campaign against the MAl were tested against Chapman and Fisher's taxonomy for NGO 
effectiveness. Therefore, the variables that contributed to the effectiveness of the ICBL 
and the campaign against the MAl have the potential to have also contributed to the 
effectiveness of other NGO campaigns. 
In this chapter, each of these three conclusions is explained, and I assess the 
practical and theoretical value of the project. 
6.1 NGO Campaign Effectiveness and the International Arena 
The ICBL and the campaign against the MAl were effective in their contributions 
to international policy changes. The ICBL concluded with the signing of the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction. The NGO campaign against the MAl concluded with the 
failure of the MAl negotiations. In the case of landmines, both NGOs and government 
officials agreed that the NGO campaign figured prominently in the setting of the policy 
agenda, in the policy discussions, and in persuading states to sign the Landmines Treaty. 
In the campaign against the MAl, NGOs and some academics, such as de Larrinaga and 
Sjolander (2000), Smythe (2001), and Wood (2000), believed that the NGO campaign 
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helped set the policy agenda to block the signing of the MAl, forced public discussion 
about the policy, and helped contribute to various governments choosing to back away 
from the MAl negotiations. The MAl ultimately failed because the OECD was not the 
right forum for the discussions and because of internal fighting between OECD members; 
however, the NGO campaign is widely agreed to have exacerbated the problems between 
MAl negotiators by creating a maelstrom of public anger over the MAl and its secretive 
process (Kobrin 2001; Smythe 2001; Mingst and Wakentin 2000). The landmines and 
MAl NGO campaigns, therefore, were both effective in contributing to policy changes: 
the Mine Ban Treaty and the end of MAl negotiations. Although the ICBL concluded 
with an international convention and the NGO campaign against the MAl with an end to 
policy negotiations, they are both international policy changes. In the ICBL's case 
landmines were banned. In the case of the MAl, the agreement, which negotiators had 
intended to sign, was never completed. 
6.2 NGO Campaigns and State-Level Foreign Policy 
These case studies highlight the essential link between state policy and 
international policy. In both NGO campaigns, state policy positions affected the 
international policy outcomes. For instance, countries like the U.S. and Canada 
demonstrated, at different points on the NGO campaigns timeline, commitments to a 
landmines ban which in tum resulted in the Ottawa Treaty. Similarly, the MAl was 
defeated because individual countries like France and Canada were unwilling to agree to 
key principles of the agreement. 
More specifically, in each campaign, there was a distinctive link between NGO's 
affecting CFP and meeting their objectives of an international policy change. In the case 
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of landmines, Canadian policymakers, urged on by NGOs, were the key actors in creating 
an international forum for the signing of the Ottawa Treaty. Similarly, in the case of the 
MAI, NGOs lobbied Canadian policymakers, in addition to policymakers of other states, 
in order to defeat the MAL In the instance of landmines, NGOs developed key 
relationships with and employed key lobbies against Canadian foreign policymakers, and 
in the case of the MAI, NGOs lobbied against the Canadian government's position on 
international investments: these inside and outside strategies contributed to the overall 
effectiveness of each campaign. 
The landmines and MAI cases have practical lessons. NGOs are interested in how 
to effectively work with or lobby against state-level policymakers. The case studies show 
that if NGOs are to be effective in the international policymaking arena, they need to 
build effective working relationships with and/or effective lobbies against state-level 
policymakers. 
6.3 The Nature of Effective NGO Campaigns 
Drawing on Chapman and Fisher's taxonomy, the landmines and MAI 
international NGO campaigns were effective for similar reasons. First, both campaigns 
were long-running, had broad-based support, and were able to advocate for a narrow 
policy agenda concurrently on many levels and in various arenas. Both NGO campaigns 
were built around coalitions and TANs, and the resulting international memberships gave 
each campaign the ability to lobby in many places at once. Furthermore, the campaigns 
used a combination of insider and outsider approaches to argue their positions, but one 
type dominated: the engagement of national governments. As a result, earning legitimacy 
was important to gaining government trust (in the case of the ICBL) and to weakening 
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governments' policy positions (in the case of the NGO campaign against the MAl). Each 
NGO campaign acted as expert sources of information and as centres for policy debate, 
but the Ottawa Process was unique because of the "unprecedented participation of 
NGOs in the negotiations"; NGOs had full say in the policy outcome (Davis 1997). 
In addition to earning legitimacy with governments, the NGO campaigns worked 
with grassroots to build momentum towards policy objectives. The landmines campaign 
was effective in unifying all levels and most parts of society against the use of landmines. 
Militaries, in a general sense, were and are the main proponent of using landmines, but, 
the ICBL was able to convince a consensus among all levels of society that landmines 
should be made illegal. Likewise, the campaign against the MAl earned legitimacy by 
making MAl draft documents public, thus earning public trust. By making nearly all of 
the MAl-related information available online, NGOs took the MAl negotiations outside 
of the OECD and put them in the public arena. 
Consistent with Chapman and Fisher, both campaigns benefited from the work 
done by key individuals - NGO leaders, politicians, and celebrities - as well as national 
laws and international conventions. By lobbying governments, courts, and individuals 
simultaneously, the NGO campaigns created momentum for policy changes. The ICBL 
had celebrity cache, such as Princess Diana who "more than any other individual, caused 
global awareness of the devastation caused by landmines to skyrocket" (Rutherford and 
White 1998, 11 0). The campaign against the MAl benefited from the individual efforts of 
Maude Barlow of the Council of Canadians and Tony Clarke of the Polaris Institute. Of 
course, there were many other key individuals, but these represent the kinds of 
personalities that pushed the policy agendas forward. 
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It is interesting that in being effective, both the lCBL and the campaign against 
the MAl employed a similar set of variables, and these sets of variables are consistent 
with those of Chapman and Fisher's taxonomy. In fact, each of Chapman and Fisher's 
eleven variables, some to varying degrees, contributed to the MBT and the failure of the 
MAL As a result, Chapman and Fisher's taxonomy is useful for understanding NGO 
campaign effectiveness in the context of achieving a policy change. 
6.4 Analysis of Chapman and Fisher's Taxonomy 
6. 4.1 Degrees of Variable Significance 
Two examples of how the variables of Chapman and Fisher's taxonomy differed 
in their significance are how the NGOs collaborated with each other and with states. For 
example, the ICBL constructed a TAN with a central secretariat whereas the NGO 
campaign against the MAl built loose coalitions with no central office. Second, the ICBL 
was extremely effective in earning legitimacy, and in turn, seats at the MBT negotiating 
table. Alternatively, the NGO campaign against the MAl was less effective at engaging 
government officials in the policy process, but it worked hard to lobby governments and 
achieved a certain level of respect as was proven when it was invited to meet with MAl 
negotiators. Each of Chapman and Fisher's variables for NGO effectiveness contributed 
to the MBT and the failure of the MAl; however there were other variables that 
contributed to the campaigns' effectiveness. 
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6.4.2 Other Variables 
Chapman and Fisher's taxonomy neglected at least three variables that 
contributed to the effectiveness of the ICBL and the NGO campaign against the MAL 
First, the taxonomy does not address the role of NGO communication strategies. For 
example, although the campaign against the MAl relied heavily up on e-mail and the 
World Wide Web to share information and coordinate activities (See 4.5 for a description 
of how online communications were used in the campaign against the MAl), the ICBL 
did not rely upon online technology until very late in its campaign. Jody Williams (2006) 
argued that the idea that the ICBL was "unique because of its reliance on e-mail is not 
fully justified." Williams (2006) suggested that the ICBL campaign unity was initially 
achieved by "extensive use of the fax machine, and regular mailings of documents and 
informational updates to campaign members." Fax and telephone communication, argues 
Williams (2006), facilitated the ICBL's daily communications. In 1996, the ICBL 
adopted electronic communication. However, Williams (2006) stated "E-mail ha[d] been 
used relatively infrequently for communications outside of the campaign, and the high 
level of cooperation between governments and NGOs during the Ottawa Process of 
negotiations was more the result of face-to-face meetings than anything else." In addition, 
networking made possible by travel, argued Williams (2006), was "as important as fax, 
phone, and e-mail communication in linking together the huge coalition, both within the 
ICBL and between campaigners and various government and military representatives." 
In the case of the NGO campaign against the MAl, online communication was 
essential to the campaign's effectiveness. The NGO campaign was started in response to 
the MAl draft, which had been leaked over the World Wide Web. Afterwards, email and 
the World Wide Web were the primary mediums for the transfer of MAl information 
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between activists. Email was cost-effective, fast, and provided the NGO campaign with 
an invaluable tool for the sharing of information and for lobbying (Bray 1998; Varney 
2000). 
However, the nature of each campmgn demanded a different set of 
communication strategies. For instance, the ICBL communicated through a central 
secretariat whereas the NGO campaign against the MAl communicated in more of a web-
like pattern with no central office. Overall, Chapman and Fisher' s taxonomy would be 
improved by addressing the role of communication strategies in facilitating the 
effectiveness ofNGO campaigns. 
Second, liminal actors helped facilitate NGO-state relationships and helped move 
the policy agendas along their timelines. In the case of the ICBL, Robert 1. (Bob) Lawson 
was one of a few Canadian diplomats that took a leadership role in the ICBL. Between 
1991 and 2001 , Lawson conducted extensive research into the social construction of the 
movement to ban landmines. He also helped set the stage for the Ottawa Process (see 
Section 3.6). By liaising between government and NGOs, Lawson helped advance the 
ICBL' s policy goal. A similar set of events happened when the US government 
announced a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines in 1992 as a result of 
Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressman Lane Evans who worked closely with American 
NGOs (Goose and Williams 1998). Leahy (1997), in fact, worked closely with people 
like Ken Rutherford and Jerry White of the Landmines Survivor Network to get artificial 
limbs to mine victims. The willingness of political actors to engage themselves with 
NGO policy initiatives was an important variable in achieving the MBT. 
Although the campaign against the MAl did not enjoy the same kinds of 
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government-NGO relations as in the campaign to ban landmines, there were politicians 
who helped put pressure onto the ruling governments to step away from the MAL For 
example, in Canada the NDP, the Green Party (which did not hold an elected seat), made 
statements against the MAl (MAl-Not! 1998), and in France, Green and Communist 
members of its coalition government played a key role in forcing France out of the MAl 
negotiations. Liminal actors played a role in each campaign; consequently, a taxonomy 
on NGO effectiveness could benefit from a closer inspection of how liminal actors help 
contribute to NGO campaign policy objectives. 
A third variable that contributed to the effectiveness of the ICBL and the NGO 
campaign against the MAl is domestic politics. For example, in Canada, during these 
campaigns, the governing Liberals prioritized policy agenda items based on public 
sentiment and affordability (Cooper 1997; Nossal 1998). In other words, there was a 
likelihood that overarching governmental mandates directed the tangible military, 
political, and economic realities of policy decisions (Beier and Crosby 1998). In the case 
of the ICBL, the landmines crisis was a humanitarian issue that generated strong 
sentimental support. It was also unlikely that Canada would fight wars requiring 
landmines (Anderson 2000). Furthermore, the Ottawa Process was affordable because 
much of the costs were paid for by the ICBL (Nossal 1998). As a result, DF AIT was able 
to override the protests of the Ministry of Defense in prioritizing the policy agenda to ban 
landmines. 
Similarly, many of the countries that signed the MBT were persuaded by 
domestic politics. For example, the UK and France both had new governments that were 
friendly to the Ottawa Process, and Latin America and Africa held strong regional 
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consensuses. On the other hand, the political context for the MAl was more complex. The 
commitment levels of MAl negotiators were varied in context to national political 
climates. The NGO campaign against the MAl benefited from weaker states like Canada 
and France refusing to agree to core principles of the MAL Furthermore, North 
Americans were wary of new trade agreements after having witnessed the controversial 
NAFT A negotiations, so the political climate was not friendly to a new international trade 
agreement that would have seen more powers being given to corporations. The point here 
is that political conditions influence the way that NGO campaigns strategize and operate. 
6.4.3 The Taxonomy's Utility 
Overall, Chapman and Fisher's taxonomy is a useful tool for understanding how 
NGO campaigns can be effective in influencing policy change. Their 11 variables of 
NGO effectiveness show that the NGO campaigns to ban landmines and to block the 
MAl were effective. Although the taxonomy does not address every variable that 
contributes to an NGO campaign's effectiveness, it provides a guideline for 
understanding and comparing the effectiveness ofNGO policy campaigns. 
Chapman and Fisher (2000) make an important point in suggesting that an NGO 
campaign's effectiveness is dependent on maintaining a policy change. In the case of 
both the ICBL and the NGO campaign against the MAl, improving and sustaining the 
policy change remains a priority. 
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6.5 The ICBL and The NGO Campaign Against the MAl Today 
NGO campaigns are concerned with monitoring and improving policies. The 
ICBL and the NGO campaign to stop the MAl are currently applying lessons learned 
from the landmines and MAl campaigns and are working on new policies. The ICBL is 
working to make the MBT universal, plus it is contributing to the NGO campaign against 
cluster munitions. The NGO campaign against the MAl exists now as a campaign against 
the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FT AA) and other international trade-related 
agreements. 
6.5.1 The ICBL 2007 
After winning the 1997 Nobel Prize for Peace, the ICBL promised to continue to 
monitor the MBT and to condemn the use of landmines (MaGrath 1997). MBT 
violations are publicized on the ICBL website, in UN press releases, and in lobby 
campaigns. For example, the ICBL reports that the National Liberation Army (Ejertico de 
Liberacion Nacional, ELN) of Colombia planted new mines on a 28km section of road 
that was cleared in 2005 (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, April Newsletter). 
By monitoring the use and effects of landmines, the ICBL intends to keep pressure on 
governments and armed groups to abide by the MBT (International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines, April Newsletter). 
In addition to monitoring the current MBT, the ICBL continues to work towards a 
universal ban on landmines. For instance, on February 20, 2007 the Republic of 
Indonesia, one of the original signatories to the MBT, deposited its instrument of 
ratification to the UN thus leaving Poland and the Marshall Islands as the only two 
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remaining signatories that have not yet ratified the MBT (International Committee to Ban 
Landmines, April Newsletter). In addition, on April 4, 2007 - the International Day for 
Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action - Sudan celebrated Mine Awareness 
Day with a rally and speeches by NGO and government actors, and in Thailand 
representatives from the Thai Campaign to Ban Landmines met with their Deputy 
Foreign Minister to discuss the state's intention to act in accordance with the MBT 
(International Committee to Ban Landmines, April Newsletter). As well, on April 4 and 
5, 2007 experts representing the ICBL, the Colombian and Sahrawi Campaigns to Ban 
Landmines, Geneva Call, and the Lebanon Landmines Resource Centre met in Barcelona, 
Spain to discuss the universalization and implementation of the MBT, plans to involve 
non-state armed actors in the MBT, and the process to reach a ban on cluster munitions 
(International Committee to Ban Landmines, April Newsletter). 
In addition to monitoring the MBT, the ICBL works on changing other 
international policies. For example, cluster bombs are the current focus of an 
international NGO campaign that is closely linked to the ICBL. NGOs gathered 
enormous amounts of statistical and anecdotal information on the effects of cluster 
munitions onto civilian populations with the intent to get a ban on cluster munitions onto 
the international policy agenda. As a consequence, in November 2006, Norway 
announced its intention to launch a process that would lead to an international ban on 
cluster munitions. On May 25, 2007, Jody Williams made the closing remarks at the 
Lima, Peru Conference on Cluster munitions: "I believe that we . . . will prevail on 
clusters as we have on landmines" (International Committee to Ban Landmines, April 
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Newsletter). It is interesting that the campaign to ban cluster munitions ' policy goals and 
processes are similar to those of the ICBL. 
6.5.2 The NGO Campaign Against the MAl 2007 
The NGO campaign against the MAl dissipated after the MAl failed, but the core 
NGOs turned their attention to protesting WTO meetings and to stopping other trade 
agreements like the FT AA. The FT AA is a major trade agreement that was planned to 
expand NAFT A from the Artie to the Antarctic - to every country in Central America, 
South America, and the Caribbean, except Cuba (34 countries in total). Although it was 
based on the NAFTA model, it would have gone far beyond NAFTA in its powers. For 
instance, the WTO's GATS was to be merged with the MAl to create a new trade 
powerhouse agreement for the Americas (Public Citizen, Global Trade Watch 2007). 
FT AA negotiators, like Canada, argued that the FT AA would ensure prosperity, 
democracy, and free markets for goods and services, which was a similar approach as 
was taken by MAl negotiators after MAl went public (Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade Canada 2007). FTAA negotiations began in 1994 and were supposed to have been 
completed by January 1, 2005 (Greenberg 2005). 
The international campaign against the FT AA began before the MAl was defeated 
and continues today. NGOs like the Council of Canadians, Public Citizen, and the 
Citizens Trade Campaign initiated publicity campaigns to raise awareness about the 
FTAA's potential negative effects. For example, the Council of Canadians released Stop 
the FTAA : Democracy Before Trade, a brief document describing the FTAA and its 
problems (available from http://www.canadians.org/trade/documents/stop _the_ ftaa-
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e.pdf), Public Citizen collected FTAA related information (available from 
http://www.citizen.org/trade/ftaa/), and the Citizens Trade Campaign produced a Call to 
Action (2003), instructions for how to disrupt forthcoming FTAA meetings (available 
from http://www.citizenstrade.org/pdf/calltoaction.pdf). The campaign grew into an 
international campaign that organized major protests around FT AA negotiations. At an 
FT AA meeting in Miami, Florida, "thousands" of trade unionists, environmentalists, 
retirees, students, fair trade advocates, members of low income communities, and others 
gathered against the FTAA (Citizens Trade Campaign 2003). Major publicity campaigns 
and public protests marred the FTAA negotiating committee's attempts to come to an 
agreement. 
Trade policy negotiators learned from the defeat of the MAL On the front page of 
the FTAA's website there is a banner titled "Participation of Civil Society," and in 
smaller font is a quote by the Ministers Responsible for Trade in the FT AA participating 
countries ( 1998): 
We recognize and welcome the interests and concerns that different 
sectors of society have expressed in relation to the FT AA. Business and 
other sectors of production, labour, environmental and academic groups 
have been particularly active in this matter. We encourage these and other 
sectors of civil societies to present their views. 
In other words, the FT AA negotiators, many of whom were party to the MAl 
negotiations, decided that engaging NGOs was less risky than ignoring them. 
Faced by enormous opposition from NGOs and some governments (Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez was a boisterous opponent), FT AA talks stalled in November 
2005 in Argentina. Although most negotiators claimed that the FT AA was not dead, there 
has not been a major meeting since. Instead FTAA meetings have morphed into Free 
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Trade Agreements (FTAs), which are trade agreements between individual countries. 
NGOs like the Council of Canadians, Public Citizen, and the Citizens Trade Campaign 
continue to adapt their strategies to protest policies that promote inequities. 
6.5.3 Summary of the Current NGO Campaigns 
Both the lCBL and the NGO campaign against the MAl continue to work. The 
lCBL has retained its core members, its central secretariat, and its narrow focus, although 
it is now also working on a campaign to ban cluster munitions. On the other hand, the 
NGO campaign against the MAl has changed into new campaigns against other trade 
agreements like the FTAA. It is significant that both NGO campaign structures are 
dynamic and that they are able to work in constant political turbulence. It would be 
interesting to compare the current NGO campaigns to Chapman and Fishers ' taxonomy. 
6.6 Lessons Learned 
There are 6 lessons learned from this study. First, Chapman and Fisher's 
taxonomy for NGO effectiveness has value in that it provides a template for testing NGO 
effectiveness. Its limitations are that it generalizes certain key issues like NGO campaign 
objectives. Nevertheless, it provides a thorough starting point for analyzing NGO 
effectiveness. Second, this research offers insights to NGO campaign policy objectives. 
Future NGO campaigns are shown how different kinds of policy changes affect the short 
and long term effectiveness of a campaign. Third, the Canadian cases of the landmines 
and MAl issues are compared which contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of 
NGOS in Canadian foreign policy. It also contributes to looking at these two case studies 
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from the perspective of testing effectiveness. Fourth, this research offers insights to NGO 
campaign structures. Specifically, it provides ideas for how to adapt campaign structures 
to specific policy initiatives. Fifth, the assessment of NGO campaigns can help support 
changing world order. Sixth, this research offers insights to NGO campaigns for future 
action. NGOs are constantly in a state of adaptation and renewal, and this research 
contributes to the body ofknowledge of how NGOs can pursue policy initiatives. 
6. 7 Future Areas of Study 
There are several areas of future study: 
Future studies in the area of NGO campaign effectiveness could analyze the 
landmines and MAl NGO international campaigns from the perspective of other 
countries or regions like the US or the EU. By gathering a more complete picture ofNGO 
effectiveness at state levels, there can be a better understanding of their activities and 
effectiveness at the national and international level. Idiosyncratic state behaviour might 
show how certain states have more influence over an international policy decision than 
others. 
Another area of study may look at how NGO effectiveness can be maximized in 
different political settings and under various international conditions. For example, what 
conditions facilitate NGO effectiveness? The variable might take into account historical 
conditions, political mandates, or dramatic events. A key question is how can NGO 
campaigns be made to be more effective when dealing with national governments? Each 
NGO campaign's effectiveness is affected by the conditions in which it works, and a 
focus on conditions will lead to a better understanding ofNGO effectiveness. 
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Third, future research might also look at NGO effectiveness in context to insider 
strategies. When NGOs are granted access to policy-making arenas, how can they be 
effective in achieiving their policy goals? In context to this, the role of liminal characters 
also deserves further attention. 
Finally, further work on how NGOs build relationships with governments and 
TANs would be useful for understanding how NGOs can affect policy processes. For 
example, an NGO campaign's effectiveness is increased when it collaborates with 
national governments, so NGOs are interested in learning how to broaden their utility, 
democratize foreign policy, and build working relationships with governments. In 
addition, NGOs are interested in building strong regional and ideological networks, so 
they are interested in learning about international NGO campaign building strategies, 
communication methods, and international financing strategies. 
6.8 Final Thoughts 
Overall, it is important to study NGO effectiveness for the following three 
reasons. First, NGOs are interested m learning how to involve themselves more 
effectively in policy decisions and want a better understanding of how NGO campaigns 
contribute to policy change. Second, research on NGO effectiveness is dependent on a 
dynamic set of variables and conditions. The complexity of international society 
continues to increase, and NGOs are keen to learn how to make themselves relevant to 
decision-making processes. Third, NGO effectiveness is important to the democratization 
of international policy processes. For example, NGO campaigns promote public 
negotiations as well as government responsibilities to human and environmental rights. 
Furthermore, NGO campaigns contribute to popular democratic struggles, and deeper 
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levels of democracy should result in increased levels of public interest and participation 
in policy processes. 
This study shows how Chapman and Fisher' s (2000) taxonomy is useful for 
understanding NGO effectiveness. By comparing the variables of effectiveness in 
different NGO campaigns, like in the ICBL and the NGO campaign against the MAl, 
lessons about NGO effectiveness are learned. For example, Chapman and Fishers' eleven 
variables are consistent in the ICBL and the NGO campaign against the MAL As a result, 
the same variables, hypothetically, contribute to other NGO campaigns' effectiveness. If 
NGO campaigns can better understand the variables that contribute to their effectiveness, 
then NGO campaigns will have increased opportunities to affect policy. 
It is unlikely, as these cases prove, that an NGO campaign cannot exactly 
duplicate its success in another campaign. The complexities of current issues combined 
with the complexities of an international NGO campaign create conditions that are 
usually only decipherable after an issue has reached its conclusion. However, by 
understanding variables that consistently contribute to NGO campaign effectiveness, 
NGOs can spend time strategizing over which issues to tackle at certain times. As well, 
the leaders of new NGO campaigns will be able to adapt their strategies based on what 
has proven to be effective in other campaigns. Ultimately, this study shows that NGO 
campaigns can be effective in influencing policy change, and this reinforces the idea that 
non-state actors play a role in making policy. 
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